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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1976, the Supreme Court of California issued its opinion in the
case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.' A leader in the
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. I would like to thank Paula Monopoli, Frank Scordato, Veryl Miles, Roger
Hartley, Geoff Watson, David Lipton, Kathy Kelly, Lisa Lerman, Ellen Scully, Sarah
Duggin, and Stephanie Hanuick for their insightful comments and suggestions. I would also
like to thank the participants in a faculty scholarship workshop on this topic at The Catholic
University of America. I am very grateful to the Columbus School of Law and Deans Veryl
Miles and Bill Fox for their continuing support of this work. I also appreciate the work of
Adam Duritz and Kevin Griffin.
' 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). This was, in fact, the second opinion issued by the California
Supreme Court in the Tarasoff case. The first was issued on December 23, 1974. Tarasoff
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development of tort law operating at the zenith of its influence,' the court was
fully aware of the national and international attention the opinion was likely to
attract. Indeed, almost without question, Tarasoff is among a handful of the
best-known tort law cases in American jurisprudence, particularly outside the
legal community.3 It has been the subject of debate and analysis for more than
thirty years.4
Doctrinally, the case made new law by recognizing, for the first time in
any American jurisdiction, a duty on the part of a therapist to use reasonable
care to protect a third person from serious danger of violence posed by the
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974). The second opinion was the result
of a rehearing of the appellate case granted by the California Supreme Court in March 1975.
Though both opinions are authored by Justice Mathew Tobriner, the second opinion makes
no mention of the existence of the first, nor does the California Supreme Court anywhere
offer any explanation for the granting of the rehearing in the case.
Peter H. Schuck and Daniel J. Givelber, citing an attorney who was then working as a
clerk for the California Supreme Court, suggest that the justices came to believe that the duty
to warn set forth in the first opinion was too narrow in scope and undertook the second
opinion in an effort to broaden it. Peter H. Schuck & Daniel J. Givelber, Tarasoff v. Regents
of the University of California: The Therapist's Dilemma, in TORTS STORIES 99, 100 n.2
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, eds., 2003).
The opinion of the intermediate court of appeal in the case, the California Court of
Appeal, can be found at Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 878 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1973).
2 See Barry A. Fisher, Devotion, Damages and Deprogrammers: Strategies and Counter-
strategies in the Cult Wars, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 151, 162 (1991); Robert L. Rabin, Federal-
ism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1997); Schuck & Givelber, supra note
1, at 106-07; Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L.
REV. 435 (1979). For a discussion of a broader movement in the expansion of tort liability
during this period, of which Tarasoff was arguably an important part, see Peter H. Schuck,
The New Judicial Ideology of Tort Law, in 37 NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITV LAW No. 1, 4-
16 (Walter Olson ed., 1988).
3 See Daniel J. Givelber, William J. Bowers & Carolyn L. Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Real-
ity: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 443, 457-58 (1984)
("[I]t is a fair guess that there is no other legal decision, with the possible exception of
controversial cases such as Brown v. Board of Education, which could command this level
of recognition among a subgroup of laypersons."); Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58
ALB. L. REV. 97 (1994) (Tarasoff "is one of the single most celebrated cases in the recent
history of American tort law. Virtually every lawyer who has taken a basic course in torts
since the late 1970s knows of the case .... ); Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma
of the Dangerous Patient: New Directions for the 1990's, 16 LAW & PSVCHOL. REV. 29
(1992) ("Over the past fifteen years, the legend of the Tarasoff case has grown to mythic
proportions."); D. L. Rosenhan et al., Warning Third Parties: The Ripple Effects of
Tarasoff, 24 PAC. L.J. 1165, 1195, 1202 (1993) ("Over 84% of the entire sample [of 600
licensed psychiatrists and 1200 licensed psychologists in California in 1987] indicated that
they have heard of Tarasoff. Further, of those therapists who answered this question, over
98% knew of the decision."); Schuck & Givelber, supra note 1, at 108, 114, 117, 127.
4 On March 20, 2007, Westlaw's KeyCite service listed 2782 documents that cited to the
Tarasoff case, including 678 cases and 1028 law review articles. On this same date, the
Lexis Shepard's Summary service yielded 1675 citing references, including 701 cases and
817 law review articles. This search updates a similar one performed on February 3, 2003
and reported in Schuck & Givelber, supra note 1, at 117 n.76, and confirms the authors'
prediction that the number of citations to the case would continue to increase significantly.
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therapist's patient, thereafter commonly known as the "Tarasoff duty."5 Prior
to the Tarasoff case, an individual owed no duty to protect a third person rea-
sonably from harm inflicted by another adult unless the defendant was in a
specially recognized legal relationship with the harm producer at the time the
harm was caused to the victim.6 Thus, prior to Tarasoff, unless the patient
harmed the victim in the therapist's waiting room, or in the therapist's pres-
ence, or while under the therapist's direct care and control, the therapist owed
the potential victim no duty to warn her reasonably of the possible danger
posed to her by the patient.7
While there are many interesting aspects of the case that have been well
noted and discussed, at least one aspect of the opinion has received much less
attention: the strikingly modem jurisprudential approach that the court adopted
to analyze the legal problem presented to it. Just ten years before, an appellate
court faced with the prospect of creating a significant new common law doc-
trine, especially in a high profile case, could have been expected to devote the
great majority of its published opinion to an identification and analysis of rele-
vant precedent and a discussion of analogous existing legal doctrine, and to
make a determined effort to place the newly-recognized duty in the broad, com-
forting context of existing rules and approaches.
This is the old style, the old school, jurisprudence, sometimes called for-
malist analysis or formalism.8 As an approach to analyzing legal issues, for-
' Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340 ("When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of
his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to
another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against
such danger.").
While it may have been the first, the Supreme Court of California was hardly the last
appellate court to recognize this new duty. Less than two years later, the Superior Court of
New Jersey followed suit in the case of McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979). According to Professor George Harris, "a majority of states now follow
Tarasoff, either by statute or case law." George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception
to the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74
WASH. L. REv. 33, 47 (1999). For two relatively recent, and well done, reviews of the post-
Tarasoff cases in this country, see Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, "Where the Public
Peril Begins" 25 Years After Tarasoff, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 187, 200-13 (2000) and Damon
Muir Walcott, Pat Cerundolo & James C. Beck, Current Analysis of the Tarasoff Duty: An
Evolution Towards the Limitation of the Duty to Protect, 19 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 325 (2001).
6 See Richards v. Stanley, 271 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 315 (1965); cases collected in West Digest key number 272k220.
7 It was on this basis that the California Court of Appeal upheld the Superior Court's dis-
missal of the plaintiffs failure to warn theory. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 108
Cal. Rptr. 878, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
8 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 9-64 (1995); GRANT GIL-
MORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977); MORTON J. HORwiTz, THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIs OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 16-17 (1992);
GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S
END 13-33 (1995); ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL
THEORY 136-59 (1982). Christopher Columbus Langdell, Joseph H. Beale, Sir William
Blackstone, and James Barr Ames are frequently identified as classical formalists.
As with any single label for a broad and sophisticated body of thought, "formalism" is
not always taken as having a clear and univocal meaning. Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formal-
ism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1138, 1144 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL
POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1998)); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE
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malism was the natural outgrowth of a particular shared conception of the work
of the common law. In other words, the approach that an appellate court is
likely to take in resolving specific issues in discreet cases is a function of the
current consensus answer to the question, "what are we, the appellate courts,
doing when we evaluate the status of, and then decide either to maintain or
change, common law doctrine?"
In the next section of this Article, I briefly describe the traditional formal-
ist conception of common law jurisprudence. I then discuss the profound chal-
lenge to this traditional view that took hold in earnest in the 1920s with the
work of the legal realists and resulted in a shift in the conventional paradigm to
what is now often called an instrumentalist approach to legal analysis.
In the third section of this Article, I analyze the famous case of Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California as an example of classic modem instru-
mentalist analysis. After setting forth the facts and the holding in the case, I
identify the major factors the court considered in deciding whether to recognize
a formal therapist duty to warn and demonstrate that such considerations are
thoroughly instrumentalist in nature.
In Section IV, I identify and describe a number of problematic aspects of
modem instrumentalist jurisprudence. Many of these troublesome characteris-
tics of instrumentalist legal analysis as currently practiced by appellate courts
in this country are a function of the trial and appellate procedures within which
the analysis is inevitably conducted. To a large extent, appellate courts are
operating within a procedural structure that was developed during a period in
which formalism was the conventional jurisprudential conception, and that is
ill-suited to modern instrumentalist analysis. Section V concludes the Article.
II. FORMALISM AND INSTRUMENTALISM IN COMMON LAW JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Formalist Approach to Common Law Jurisprudence
The formalist approach to common law analysis emerged from what is
often called the natural law view of legal doctrine.9 This view, which domi-
nated the Anglo-American legal community during the nineteenth century,
assumed the existence, at least theoretically, of a more or less ideal set of stan-
dards and principles by which human behavior should be governed - a so-
called natural law.'o From this perspective, one critical task of the legal system
L.J. 509 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 636, 638 (1999). Neither, for that matter, is "natural law." M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 90 (7th ed. 2001).
9 The roots of natural law extend as far back as fifth century Athens. Henry Mather, Natu-
ral Law and Liberalism, 52 S.C. L. REV. 331, 332 (2001); Lloyd L. Weinreb, A Secular
Theory of Natural Law, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2287, 2288-90 (2004). As a jurisprudential
philosophy, it has exerted a profound influence on the Anglo-American legal tradition,
including American constitutional law. Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution,
and the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2269, 2275-76
(2001). John Finnis has been a leading proponent of natural law in the modern era. See
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
10 See FREEMAN, supra note 8, at 90 ("[T]he essence of natural law may be said to lie in the
constant assertion that there are objective moral principles which depend upon the nature of
the universe .... An appropriate analogy are mathematical axioms which hold good even
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in a given society is to develop the actual law of the jurisdiction over time so
that it more and more closely approximates the ideal, natural law."1
This concept of law and the work of a legal system has at least two obvi-
ous, and very powerful, influences. The first is the religious tradition, in which
there very commonly exist absolute and immutable principles of human behav-
ior, often directives from God, which religious communities strive in their vari-
ous ways to understand, interpret, and apply to concrete situations.12 Much as
a particular organized religion may establish a formal structure within which to
organize and memorialize its ongoing interpretation of religious doctrine, the
natural law paradigm sees the appellate court system as one in which a jurisdic-
tion's understanding of the secular common law is continually reviewed and
refined. Both perspectives view this process as one that strives, over time, to
align their current interpretations more closely with the ultimately correct
meaning and proper interpretation of the ideal standards.
The second profound influence on the development of the natural law
view was science and the scientific method. 13 It is no surprise that those seek-
ing a general understanding of the nature of the Anglo-American system of
common law might reach for a model to what is among the most profoundly
successful and influential human enterprises of the past two centuries: natural
science."1 Traditionally, it is assumed that the natural world operates according
to some set of basic rules and principles - that minerals and chemicals and
when misunderstood or undiscovered."); Mather, supra note 9, at 332 ("Natural law theories
assert that positive, man-made law should be formulated and evaluated according to a higher
moral law (the natural law) that is not made by humans, but is inherent in the nature of the
universe.").
The renowned anthropologist Margaret Mead attempted to identify rules of behavior
that were observed to be universal across all known cultures. Margaret Mead, Some Anthro-
pological Considerations Concerning Natural Law, 6 NAT. L. F. 51 (1961).
11 Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formalism in Constitutional Law: Constitutional
Theory Matters, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) ("A belief in formalism dominated jurispru-
dence during the nineteenth century. Principles of law were seen as existing as part of the
natural law and the role of judges was to discover them. Judging was conceived as a rela-
tively mechanical act of applying law to the facts of the particular case.").
12 See SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW [BEING SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-I,
QQ. 90 through 97] 160 (R. J. Henle ed. & trans., 1993); George, supra note 9, at 2269;
Kent Greenawalt, How Persuasive is Natural Law Theory?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1647,
1676-77 (2000); Patrick H. Martin, Natural Law: Voegelin and the End of [Legal] Philoso-
phy, 62 LA. L. REv. 879, 881 (2002).
13 See GILMORE, supra note 8, at 42-43; MINDA, supra note 8, at 13 ("Langdell's casebook
ushered in the modem era because it offered a new methodology and pedagogy for law study
that was nothing more than an expression of faith in the scientific method."); Christopher C.
Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, in 3 L. Q. REV. 123 (1887), also available in 21
AM. L. REV. 123 (1887); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 271-72 (1997).
Even prominent opponents recognize this aspect of natural law. BENJAMIN CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (Gaunt, Inc. 1998) (1921) ("[T]he demon of
formalism tempts the intellect with the lure of scientific order.").
14 Robert Summers has offered the interesting suggestion that the very visible advance of
technology during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries operated as an important
factor in the decline of formalism and the rise of instrumentalism because it "reinforced the
instrumentalist view that man can transform the social order by his own effort." SUMMERS,
supra note 8, at 30.
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planets alike possess consistent, stable characteristics and respond to similar
stimuli in a similar fashion over time. These basic principles of science are,
tellingly, sometimes referred to as the "laws of nature."'
15
It is the task of fundamental science to identify and articulate these laws of
nature. At any given time, the scientific community will have a working draft,
a tentative set of hypotheses, that represents its current best understanding of
the actual principles. Through experimentation and the scientific method, by a
case-by-case testing of the current hypotheses, science as a whole hopes over
time to move its current understanding closer and closer to the actual. 1
6
Analogously, from a natural law perspective, litigation in a common law
system serves as the concrete case-by-case experiments that test the efficacy of
the current common law doctrine.' 7 When application of an existing doctrine
to a live dispute produces a satisfying result, the wisdom, thus the accuracy, of
the rule is affirmed and its status as common law is strengthened. When proper
application of the existing rule results in an unacceptable result, pressure builds
to revise the rule or perhaps to create an exception to it. Over the course of
thousands of cases and decades of decisions, the common law of a jurisdiction
should significantly improve and evolve ever closer to the ideal, abstract, natu-
ral law. 1 8
In a common law system based upon such a conception, the primary func-
tion of a trial court, after shepherding the litigation through the pleading, dis-
covery, and fact determination stages, is to identify the appropriate general
rules of law, insure that these rules are deductively applied to the specific facts
of the case, and announce a result.' 9 In a sense, while going about the specific
15 H.L.A. Hart has notoriously rejected the comparison of natural law in its jurisprudential
sense with the so-called laws of nature, arguing that the two concepts employ the idea of law
in importantly different senses and illustrating his argument by pointing out that while
humans can violate legal requirements that perfectly embody natural law, humans cannot, as
a definitional matter, violate a law of nature. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 183
(1961).
16 This is what Thomas Kuhn has famously called "normal science." THOMAS S. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23-34 (3d ed. 1996).
17 See MINDA, supra note 8, at 24 ("During the first part of this century, the study of juris-
prudence was like an inductive science: principles of law were pragmatically derived from
the raw data of appellate opinions much in the same way that the laws of nature were derived
from scientific experiments."); James G. Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 431, 460 (1985) ("To support the prevailing image that judges did not make law, but
only applied law, lawyers combined Langdell's two beliefs that law was a science and that
principles, once discovered, were perpetually valid, with Holmes' theory that liability should
be limited to objective injury. . . . Judges believed they were scientists who objectively
discovered the right decision by applying the proper underlying principles to the objective
facts of harm.").
18 SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 140 ("Blackstone held that judges do not make law, they only
search out and discover it." (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 69-70 (William
G. Hammond ed., 1890)). See also Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi, The Theory and Politics of
Postmodernism: By Way of an Introduction, in POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIETY 13-16 (Roy
Boyne & Ali Rattansi eds., 1990).
19 Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND. L.
REV. 57, 69 (2003) ("The formalist adjudicative theory thus depicted entails a deductive
procedure. It is deductive in the sense that a rule as a major premise and a set of facts as a
minor premise generates a right answer."); Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning:
Formalism, Analogy, and Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 309 (2003) ("Formalist arguments
[Vol. 7:263
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business of resolving genuine disputes among persons, the trial courts also per-
form the important function of testing the efficacy of existing common law
doctrine across a wide spectrum of actual cases. Much like the role of empiri-
cal experimentation in the scientific enterprise, the resolution of cases at the
trial court level continually tests the accuracy of existing common law doctrine
by demonstrating the specific consequences of those doctrines in a wide range
of actual disputes.
The primary function of an appellate court in such a system is to review
the logical soundness of the work of the trial court. Much like a scientific
review panel might confirm the basic structure and analysis of a certain experi-
ment before publishing a report of its results, the appellate court's primary task
is to "check the math" of the trial court below, to insure that the appropriate
rules of law were selected to resolve the matter and to see that they were accu-
rately applied to the facts to determine the final outcome.2 ° Just as the review
panel in science is unlikely to perform the actual experiment again, or to audit
the accuracy of the empirical data seriously, so, too, do appellate courts refrain
from gathering any new facts about the case or engaging in any revision of the
facts established during the trial court process.2 1
are deductive in nature, and conform to the structure of a syllogism of deductive logic: the
rule of law is the major premise, the facts of the case are the minor premise, and the legal
result is the conclusion."); Leiter, supra note 8, at 1145 ("Pure formalists view the judicial
system as if it were a giant syllogism machine, with a determinate, externally-mandated legal
rule supplying the major premise, and objectively 'true' pre-existing facts providing the
minor premise. The judge's job is to act as a highly skilled mechanic with significant
responsibility for identifying the 'right' externally-mandated rule, but with little legitimate
discretion over the choice of the rule." (quoting Burt Neubome, Of Sausage Factories and
Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 421 (1992)).
20 As a general and fundamental matter of appellate practice, only those issues raised at trial
can be challenged on appeal. DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL 3
(4th ed. 2000); DANIEL JOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 55-56 (1994); ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL
CASES 38-71 (1941).
For a discussion of the origin and rationale of this general rule, and a description of
some of the exceptions that exist, see ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRAC-
TICE: FEDERAL AND STATE CIVIL APPEALS 34-42 (1983); Richard V. Campbell, Extent to
Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved, Part
1, 7 Wis. L. REV. 91 (1932); Richard V. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will
Consider Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved, Part 11, 7 Wis. L. REV. 160 (1932);
Richard V. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions Not Prop-
erly Raised and Preserved, Part 111, 8 Wis. L. REV 147 (1933); Note, Raising New Issues on
Appeal, 64 HARV. L. REV. 652 (1951). An excellent treatment of this subject, suggesting
increasing confusion on the part of appellate courts regarding the operation of the basic rule
and its exceptions, can be found at Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues On Appeal:
The General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023 (1987). The most recent
discussion of this subject in the academic literature is Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate
Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1253 (2002).
21 See United States v. Vest, 116 F.3d 1179, 1189 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 522 U.S.
1119 (1998) (citing United States v. Mason, 974 F.2d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 1992) and United
States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 959 n.15 (7th Cir. 1990)). See also KNIBB, supra note 20, at
467 ("In reality, however, the court of appeals will rarely look beyond the transmitted
record."); MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 55 ("[A]n appellate court considers only
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Occasionally, an appellate court might find that the deductively accurate
resolution of a particular case leads to such a manifestly unacceptable result
that it will decide instead to make a change to existing common law doctrine.
Consistent with the normal progress of the natural sciences, appellate courts
operating within the formalist tradition should be rather conservative about
altering the common law and should be more resistant to changing older, well-
established doctrine than more recently-created law. Moreover, such courts are
always particularly mindful of crafting any new doctrine to fit carefully within
the existing pattern of precedent. In the same way that one would not expect
the scientific community to embrace a fundamental change to previously under-
stood principles on the basis of just a few problematic experimental results, one
would not expect the appellate courts of a given jurisdiction to endorse a signif-
icant alteration or addition to the existing common law without the pressure of
a number of problematic trial-level results urging such action.
The evolution of the common law under a formalist conception is, there-
fore, conservatively incremental and likely to occupy only a small percentage
of the time and attention of the appellate courts.2 2 The normal work of appel-
late courts under such a view is the routine review and approval, or correction,
of the work of the trial courts. 23 Inevitably, such work will entail the refine-
ment and clarification of the existing common law in the jurisdiction. Only
rarely, however, would one expect an appellate court opinion to effect dramatic
change to existing doctrine or to announce the creation of strikingly new law.
The basic structure of appellate litigation, and the thrust of appellate pro-
cedure, is consistent with a formalist conception of common law jurisprudence.
Appellate courts do not seek, nor do they permit, additional facts about the case
under consideration. They do not hear new testimony from the witnesses at
trial or from the parties. They do not seek additional clarifying information
from expert witnesses. They do not interview any of the jurors. They do not
question the trial judge. They do not review video or audio tapes of the trial.
Instead, appellate courts review and determine the adequacy of the trial below,
no matter how long the trial or complex the matter tried, on the basis of the
written record of the trial, the formal written briefs of counsel, and often no
more than thirty minutes of oral argument by each side.
those facts that were established at trial and reviews only those questions that were properly
raised and presented in the trial court as evidenced by the record.").
Though rare, courts of appeals will occasionally consider materials outside of the
record, Young v. City of Augusta, Ga., 59 F.3d 1160, 1168 (11 th Cir. 1995) (citing Jones v.
White, 992 F.2d 1548, 1566-68 (11 th Cir. 1993)), and will generally do so on a case-by-case
basis. Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1555 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Ross v. Kemp,
785 F.2d 1467, 1474 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
One of the exceptions to the general rule sometimes followed by appellate courts is the
consideration of so-called "legislative" facts, which might include social science data
presented by the parties for the first time on appeal. 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M.
MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 123-31 (7th ed. 1998).
22 SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 139-40.
23 Leiter, supra note 8, at 1145-46 ("[W]e may characterize formalism as the descriptive
theory of adjudication according to which (1) the law is rationally determinate, and (2) judg-
ing is mechanical. It follows, moreover, from (1), that (3) legal reasoning is autonomous,
since the class of legal reasons suffices to justify a unique outcome; no recourse to non-legal
reasons is demanded or required.").
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Pretty clearly, then, when a supervisory court reviews the usually difficult
and subtle work of a subordinate court on the basis of the dry transcript, a few
written submissions, and a brief verbal presentation, the superior court is not
seriously engaged in a thorough audit of the adequacy of the work below, but is
instead more or less "checking the math" of the trial court, reviewing only
questions of law to insure that the trial judge reached for the correct doctrine
and applied it to the situation in a logical manner.
Entirely appropriate to this conception of the appellate process is the fact
that the active participants are all attorneys. Counsel to the parties brief the
case and participate in oral argument, and the appellate judges decide. Consis-
tent with the analogy of appellate review to a scientific panel's oversight of an
experimental report, only the experts in the formal analysis need participate. In
the appellate process it is only the state certified and licensed experts in legal
analysis, the attorneys and the judges, who participate. No one else is thought
to be needed for the kind of technical review of the deductive work of the lower
court that is contemplated from a formalist perspective.
For many decades the formalist conception was the primary means by
which the Anglo-American legal community understood the function and oper-
ation of common law jurisprudence. Trial courts handled all of the work asso-
ciated with the issue clarification, factual investigation, trial, and disposition of
particular cases. The appellate courts reviewed the trial court's handling of
questions of law and in the process tried incrementally to improve the quality
of the common law in the jurisdiction by making occasional, modest changes to
it. The fundamentally cautious and conservative nature of the change that
appellate courts were expected to make to the common law is illustrated, and
also enforced, by the rule of stare decisis that requires subordinate courts to
follow as precedent only the holding of prior superior court opinions and not
the dicta.24
B. The Shift from Formalism to Instrumentalism
This dominant formalist conception of common law jurisprudence eventu-
ally came under increasingly serious challenge. To more and more partici-
pants, as well as observers, the notion of trial courts as mere managers of the
case and predictable administrators of existing doctrine failed to describe what
was actually happening in the disposition of these cases.2 5 Similarly, the actual
work of the appellate courts, and the opinions that they issued, did not seem to
be captured in a satisfying way by the formalist narrative.2 6
24 Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITr. L. REV. 1, 24-26 (1983).
25 See Felix S. Cohen, The Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, in THE LEGAL CON-
SCIENCE 77, 81-82 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1960) ("Judicial opinions have been viewed as
no more and no less reliable than the statements in which octogenarians, golf champions, or
successful bankers explain their achievements."); G. Edward White, From Sociological
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century
America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1000-02 (1972). See generally PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972).
26 See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 156 (1988); G.
Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and
Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 281 (1973).
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One powerful critique of the formalist account focused on the supposedly
tight logical structure of induction and deduction that was said to characterize
common law jurisprudence.2 7 From a formalist perspective, a common law
doctrine begins as the concrete resolution of a dispute, or a series of similar
disputes, that are rationalized by an articulated general principle of decision.
This generalized principle of decision should, if designed correctly, harmonize
and make consistent the varied results in specific cases from which it was
induced. This principle of decision, once established, is then relied upon by
courts later facing a similar dispute and is deductively applied to reach a dispo-
sition in the new case.2 8
The general legal doctrine that is developed through this process of induc-
tion is, then, in a sense, tested to see if it produces an acceptable result each
time it is deductively applied to a new case. Occasionally, on review, an appel-
late court will be unsatisfied with the operation of the doctrine and will tinker
with it by amending it slightly or by recognizing an exception to it. In this way,
much like the currently understood principles of science, the body of common
law in a jurisdiction, continually tested by the results of empirical experiments,
slowly evolves and improves. Just as we hope that our currently understood
principles of science move closer and closer to being the actual laws of nature,
so, too, we hope in a formalist world that our actual common law moves ever
closer to an ideal set of legal principles, often referred to as natural law.2 9
Starting most famously in the 1920s with writers like Karl Llewellyn and a
movement that came to be known as legal realism, the formalist description of
the work of the courts was challenged as being unsatisfying and insufficient.3"
27 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 810-12 (1935); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of
Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs.
L. & Soc. 3, 9-14 (1980). See generally PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN
AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 99-265 (1965).
28 See Cox, supra note 19, at 92, 94 ("[I]t is important to again recognize that the classical
formalists were engaged in an inductive project of identifying principles that would recon-
cile, systemize, and render coherent the common law .... Science, for classical formalists,
entailed the paradigm of a closed logical system. The objective was to render law on the
model of geometry.").
29 Randy E. Barnett, A Law Professor's Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 655, 658 (1997) ("Americans at the founding of the United States
well-accepted the idea that the world, including worldly governments, is governed by laws
or principles that dictate how society ought to be structured, in the very same way that such
natural laws dictate how buildings ought to be built or how crops ought to be planted."
(citing Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102
YALE L.J. 907 (1993))).
30 Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank are frequently identified as the two central figures in
the emergence of legal realism. White, supra note 25, at 1017. Other prominent realists
include Felix Cohen, Walter Wheeler Cook, Leon Green, Joseph Hutchenson, Underhill
Moore, Herman Oliphant, Max Radin, and Hessel Yntema. The first self-conscious state-
ment of legal realism is said to be Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next
Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930), followed shortly thereafter by Karl Llewellyn, Some
Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
A very fine description of the realist appraisal of formalism can be found at HORWITZ,
supra note 8, at 183-230.
Legal realism has been characterized as being part of a much larger intellectual move-
ment of that era that involved "a general reorientation from a deductive rationalism to an
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The realists claimed that the actual work of both the trial and appellate courts
was far more expansive and value-laden than was captured by the tight process
of logical induction and deduction and the strict discipline of prior precedent,
holding, and dicta imposed by the doctrine of stare decisis that is so much a
part of the formalist conception. 3
The legal realists offered a very different account of the structure and pro-
cess of common law jurisprudence. As much as treatise writers and codifiers
might have presented it in that way, the realists did not look at the common law
and see a coherent, cohesive, relatively well-organized body of rules analogous
to the current state of understanding in a mature natural science like physics or
chemistry. Instead, the realists saw the common law as more of a cloud of
assorted principles, aphorisms, and maxims, some relatively tightly organized
around particular topics and issues, and others not much integrated into a larger
structure at all.3 2 To varying degrees, there existed support in the way of pre-
cedent for most all of the many tenets and precepts that constituted the common
law. Thus, most all of it possessed formal status under the doctrine of stare
decisis.
The critical feature of the common law that significantly distinguished it
from the body of principles that made up a natural science, said the realists, was
the fact that some, perhaps many, of the rules and maxims that were contained
within the common law were potentially in direct contradiction with one
inductive empiricism." Christopher Shannon, The Dance of History, 8 YALE J. L. &
HUMAN. 495, 496 (1996) (reviewing JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995)) (citing MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN
AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1949)).
While it is, of course, problematic to characterize a broad and powerful intellectual
movement like legal realism in a simple, univocal manner, see DUXBURY, supra note 8, at
65, it has been said that one common unifying theme in realist thought is its critical analysis
of classic formalism. See MINDA, supra note 8, at 26 ("The only foundational belief shared
by the realists was their common skepticism about the claims of legal formalists. What
united and defined the legal realist movement was the criticism it raised about the formal
style of modem jurisprudence."); ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURIS-
PRUDENCE 75 (1998) ("Antiformalism in law is at the foundation of legal realism."). See
also Leiter, supra note 8, at 1147 n.30 (1999) ("Realists were certainly antiformalists, but
this way of describing Realism obscures the fact that Realists shared a positive view about
what goes on in adjudication.").
31 See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Cohen, supra note 27, at
809; John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 17 (1924); Roscoe Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). For a more recent reaffirmation
of this critique, made in the context of an article that partially defends formalism, see Cox,
supra note 19, at 84, which states:
I do not believe that legal decision in hard cases can be thought of as compelled by past practice,
even though that practice will substantially limit the alternatives. Indeed, I do not even believe
that "reason" determines the choice between the alternatives thrown up by past practice.... The
pretense of decision compelled by reference to principle may be a necessary pretense in such
cases, but it is, I think, absurd to believe, as our legal culture asserts and purports to believe, that
there are correct answers in hard cases, discoverable through reason.
(citing PAUL F. CAMPOS, JURISMANIA: THE MADNESS OF AMERICAN LAW (1998)).
32 See FRANK, supra note 3 1, at 130; Kenneth M. Casebeer, Escape From Liberalism: Fact
and Value in Karl Llewellyn, 1977 DUKE L.J. 671, 684-702 (1977).
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another.3 3 A judge, faced with the task of resolving a particular legal issue in a
case, could look to the existing common law in the relevant jurisdiction and
likely find two or more honored principles, either of which could be logically
applied to resolve the issue, and each of which, when deductively applied to the
problem, would yield an opposite result.
34
For example, imagine the first time that a court had to deal with the prob-
lem of an inaccurate offer in contract law, made without the fault of the offer-
ing party. Suppose that B is a very successful retailer of clothes, currently quite
fashionable and in vogue. In order to gain exposure and access to the large
market that B currently enjoys, A, a manufacturer of clothing, sends to B an
offer to sell certain clothing produced by A for "$1.50 a piece." Due to no
mistake or carelessness on the part of A, the message that is received by B
states "$1 a piece." B reads the offer, reasonably believes that it is a genuine
offer from A, and promptly accepts. Is A bound by B's acceptance of the offer?
A court looking at this problem as an issue of first impression, long before
the modem consensus on the issue had been formed,35 might reasonably deter-
mine that the well-accepted contract law maxim that an offeror is the master of
his offer should appropriately apply, and therefore that A is bound to B.36 The
same court could just as well determine that the appropriate principle to apply
to this issue is the equally honored notion that a binding contract should only
arise from an authentic meeting of the minds of the potentially contracting par-
ties, and therefore because A never actually intended to make such an offer to
B, A is not legally bound to B.37
In a strictly formalist system, either decision is technically correct and
ought to be upheld on appeal. Both approaches start with widely-recognized
33 Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1232-39 (1985);
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 470 (1988) (reviewing
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). See also Max Radin, Stat-
utory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 873-75 (1930).
34 Llewellyn's classic statement of this position appears in Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Con-
strued, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). See also Llewellyn, supra note 30, at 1239 ("[Iun any
case doubtful enough to make litigation respectable the available authoritative premises...
are at least two, and. . . the two are mutually contradictory as applied to the case in hand.").
35 The current consensus is stated in RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981).
36 See, e.g., Ayer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 10 A. 495, 497 (Me. 1887). This result represents
the so-called objective theory of assent in contract law. See generally Melvin Aron Eisen-
berg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107 (1984); E. Allan
Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1976); Joseph M.
Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000).
37 See, e.g., Holtz v. W. Union Tel. Co., 3 N.E.2d 180, 182-83 (Mass. 1936). This result
represents the so-called subjective theory of assent in contract law. The maxim that a con-
tractual obligation requires a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties is still respect-
fully cited by courts in this country. Relatively recent examples among just the federal
courts include: Dumas v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 654 F.2d 359, 360 (5th Cir. Unit B
Aug. 1981) ("A binding contract must be predicated upon a meeting of the minds."); Inter-
state Indus., Inc. v. Barclay Indus., Inc., 540 F.2d 868, 870 (7th Cir. 1976) ("To form a
contract then, it is necessary to show agreement or a meeting of the minds."); Katz v.
Abrams, 549 F. Supp. 668, 672 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("Furthermore, it is the meeting of the minds
of the parties that is relevant in contracting.").
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doctrines of the common law and apply them with deductive accuracy to reach
their different results. Neither approach gets "the math" wrong in a way that
should invoke an appellate reversal. And yet each approach leads to different
resolutions of the exact same issue arising in the same case from a single set of
facts.
The thrust of the realist critique on this point was that the formalist con-
ception of common law adjudication was, in practice, largely indeterminate.38
Not just subtly indeterminate in cases of unusually difficult logical challenges
or especially ambivalent facts, but profoundly indeterminate along a wide spec-
trum of potential issues. 3 9 The source of this indeterminacy, said the realists,
was the co-existence of equally established but potentially contradictory princi-
ples and maxims residing within the universe of principles and maxims that
constituted the common law in a given jurisdiction at any given time.4 °
The existence of equally authoritative principles that could result in impor-
tantly different outcomes when logically applied to the facts of a specific case
meant that the real action in deciding these cases was not taking place in the
deductive application of the common law to the facts of the case, as was sup-
posed by the formalist model. Instead, it was occurring at the point of choosing
which of the possible common law principles should be selected and applied to
resolve the dispute.4 From this perspective, the ultimate resolution of most
cases was decided and sealed once the court selected the legal principle that
was to be applied. In practice, only rarely did a genuine and significant issue
exist regarding the logical application of the selected principle to the facts of
the specific case.42
This characterization of the operation of the common law legal system can
be seen as having its counterpart in the larger world as well. That is to say that
a person trying to decide how to proceed in a given situation can reach for one
31 See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism For Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 478-84
(1990).
39 See FRANK, supra note 31, at 3-75.
40 See MINDA, supra note 8, at 41-42 ("Even if one were to accept the existence of 'rea-
soned elaboration,' 'neutral principles,' or 'objective interpretation,' judges would still need
guidelines to know how to choose between any number of possible competing principles
ascertainable from different interpretations of the constitution, legislation and prior court
decisions."); Addison Mueller & Murray L. Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral Principles, 7
UCLA L. REV. 571, 586 (1960) ("The difficulty ... is that there will always be a point at
which an extension of the logic of any constitutional principle of decision will run into the
similarly extended logic of competing principles.").
41 See Schauer, supra note 8, at 513-14 ("Thus, one view of the vice of formalism takes that
vice to be one of deception, either of oneself or of others. To disguise a choice in the
language of definitional inexorability obscures that choice and thus obstructs questions of
how it was made and whether it could have been made differently."). See also Cohen, supra
note 27; Dewey, supra note 31; Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9-25 (1984).
42 One of the most famous quotes by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. appears at the very
beginning of his 1881 book, THE COMMON LAW:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time,
the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious,
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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or another of a variety of well-recognized and generally accepted maxims, or
principles, of conventional wisdom and can end up deciding to act in either one
or another of two polar opposite directions, depending upon the specific maxim
that is selected.
For example, should I buy a new computer system for my business? Well,
a penny saved is a penny earned; but, you've got to spend money to make
money. Should I stay up late into the night again and polish this brief? I know
that in order to succeed, I need to keep my nose to the grindstone; although on
the other hand, all work and no play makes Jack a dull boy. Should I worry
that being away from home so much is distancing me from the ones I love?
They say that absence makes the heart grow fonder, but they also say that out
of sight is out of mind. When I get back home, and the kids misbehave, should
I respond with physical punishment? If I spare the rod, then I'll spoil the child;
although, of course, violence teaches violence.
Regardless of the larger philosophical status of the conflict between for-
malism and realism, the legal realist critique of formalism and the realists'
alternative account of common law jurisprudence resonated with large numbers
of lawyers and legal academics. Before long, the realist conception of the work
of the courts became the prevailing perspective.43 Fewer and fewer observers
continued to believe that the primary work of the appellate courts was a more
or less technical review of the deductive logic of the lower courts, with an
occasional revision of the existing common law.44 Increasingly, both observers
and participants came to view the work of the appellate courts as heavily value-
laden, involving the selection of specific principles, and thus resultant specific
outcomes, from a variety of nearly equal logical possibilities.45 The values and
policies that guided these selections might be more or less explicit, or tacitly
underlying, but in either case they were nevertheless operative in the process.46
If the common law were no longer to be seen as analogous to the laws of
nature, something that may not at present be in a completely satisfactory form
but which we strive to improve upon over time as we test it against the constant
flow of cases that are processed by the court systems, what then is a more
acceptable concept of it? Why should the courts prefer one possible version of
a common law doctrine to another? On what broader principled basis could an
advocate try to convince a court to create a new exception to an existing com-
41 See Singer, supra note 33, at 467 ("All major current schools of thought are, in signifi-
cant ways, products of legal realism. To some extent, we are all realists now.").
44 Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 2 ("Now, a century after the legal realists' attack on
formalism, we all surely would say that formalism is gone. Everyone recognizes, of course,
that the values of the judges making the decisions largely determines all law, and particularly
constitutional law."). This is particularly true of legal academics and legal education.
MINDA, supra note 8, at 32 ("Most law teachers today regard themselves as legal realists.");
Wilkins, supra note 38, at 469 ("Legal realism has dominated American legal education for
over half a century.").
45 See GILMORE, supra note 8, at 87; Arthur J. Jacobson, Taking Responsibility: Law's
Relation to Justice and D'Amato's Deconstructive Practice, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1755, 1755
(1996) ("Not one rule suffers from determinacy in the United States today. Mere law words
have completely stopped constraining any judicial decision. I know. I've litigated.").
46 See Wilson, supra note 17, at 460 ("By focusing on the policy effects and on the diverse
resolutions of similar cases, the realists demonstrated how judges made law according to
their underlying beliefs. The process was inherently political.").
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mon law rule or to recognize a new common law doctrine altogether? What is
the reason for asking an advocate to place her preferred resolution of a case into
the structure of a jurisdiction's existing precedent if we did not have faith that
the existing precedents represent some settled understanding of the best treat-
ment of a particular issue?
C. The Instrumentalist Approach to Common Law Jurisprudence
As the formalist paradigm waned under the continuing critical challenge
of the realist movement, the emerging perspective that came to replace it
viewed the common law not as the current product of a long-term search for the
best, the ideal, the natural law, but instead as a social tool, one among many,
that could be brought to bear to try to achieve particular social outcomes or
solve particular social problems.47 From such a perspective the primary pur-
pose of contract law, then, is not so much to discover the abstractly optimal set
of rules governing the exchange of promises among members of society, but is
instead to maximize beneficial reliance and to minimize friction in executory
transactions.48 Similarly, the goal of tort law is much less to articulate the
proper obligation owed by one who harms another than to fashion a set of rules
that maximizes compensation to victims and deters future harm producing
behavior.4 9
Thus, tort law would be seen much less as a great social statement on the
responsibility of citizens for harm caused to others or their property than as a
particular social system, operating within a complicated complex of other
social systems, such as criminal law, insurance, and government benefit pro-
grams, seeking to minimize injury and to provide adequate compensation to the
injured. From this perspective, the common law generally is seen primarily as
another tool, or an instrument, for attaining desired results in society. Thus this
view of the law is often called instrumentalism.5 °
From an instrumentalist perspective the practical force of precedent in the
determination of the outcome of a given case is inevitably far less than it would
47 See Jerry Elmer, Legal Realism, Legal Formalism and the D'Oench Duhme Doctrine: A
Perspective on R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. NFD, 53 R.I. B.J. 9, 11 (2004) ("Today,
we are all Legal Realists. Being Realists, we understand two things: that judges do make
law, not just find it, and that public policy considerations may properly enter into a judge's
deliberations."); Huhn, supra note 19, at 305 ("Starting about 1910, legal realism - or policy
analysis - entered legal reasoning to the point that today it would be unusual to find a
judicial opinion or brief that fails to explore the policy implications of an interpretation of
the law.").
48 SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 151.
49 Cox, supra note 19, at 93-94 ("The law of torts, of contract, of property are now largely
conceptualized in these instrumental terms both within academia and within the
profession.").
50 See SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 20-21. See also Cardozo, supra note 13, at 66 ("The final
cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its aim cannot permanently
justify its existence.").
For an effort to elaborate upon, and to complicate, the conventional notion of instru-
mentalism, see R. S. Summers, NaiVe Instrumentalism and the Law, in LAW, MORALITY,
AND SOCIETY 119-31 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977).
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be under a formalist conception. 5' For the formalist, the existing common law
represents the distillate of many decades of articulation, testing, tinkering, and
improvement of the doctrine. It is our current best formulation of ideal regula-
tion in the field, and it is not to be disregarded or tampered with lightly. In fact,
a court operating within a formalist model would be required to meet a heavy
burden before resolving a particular dispute in a manner that was not consistent
with the existing pattern of precedent in the jurisdiction.5 2
For an instrumentalist, adherence to the existing precedent in a jurisdiction
may be valuable to the extent that it permits parties to anticipate accurately the
outcome of disputes, thus reducing the volume of costly litigation brought into
the system. It may also be valued because such adherence will result in a more
consistent resolution of similar cases brought into the system at different times
or decided by different courts within the same system, thus advancing a certain
kind of fairness. On the other hand, adherence to an existing precedent from an
instrumentalist perspective is a hindrance to the extent that it slows the altera-
tion of the common law to achieve desired outcomes more effectively, or it
makes more difficult the changing of existing common law to reflect new goals
or to respond to new problems.53
For the formalist, the existing common law is a carefully constructed
social canon in which decades of painstaking thought and practical testing have
been invested. To the instrumentalist, it is a tool, one whose primary value is
its ability to be used at a given time and place to respond to the currently
understood needs of the society.54 If the tool is no longer doing the job that is
currently required, then the obligation of the user is to modify the instrument
until it performs more effectively.
III. TARASOFF V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
A. The Facts of the Case
The facts of the Tarasoff case are as simple as they are sad.5 5 Dr. Law-
rence Moore was a psychologist working for the Cowell Memorial Hospital at
51 See SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 143, 162-63, 167, 170; G. Edward White, From Realism
to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 Sw. L.J. 819, 828 (1986)
("By the 1940s it was no longer possible for judges to ground decisions on appeals to law as
a disembodied entity or as a bundle of settled precedents.").
52 SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 149-50 (describing the use of legal fiction by formalist judges
to maintain the appearance of adherence to existing precedent).
5" See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 26, at 153. For a very sophisticated treatment of the
nature of precedent within both formalist and instrumentalist conceptions of the common
law, see Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
5" See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 30
(1977) ("Law was no longer conceived of as an eternal set of principles expressed in custom
and derived from natural law. Nor was it regarded primarily as a body of rules designed to
achieve justice only in the individual case. Instead, judges came to think of the common law
as equally responsible with legislation for governing society and promoting socially desira-
ble conduct. The emphasis on law as an instrument of policy encouraged innovation and
allowed judges to formulate legal doctrine with the self-conscious goal of bringing about
social change.").
55 The barest facts of the case are set forth by the California Supreme Court in its opinion.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339-40, 341 (Cal. 1976). A slightly
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the University of California at Berkeley.56 On August 20, 1969, during the
course of his treatment, Prosenjit Poddar, a patient, indicated to Dr. Moore his
intention to kill Tatiana Tarasoff upon her return to the United States from
Brazil, which he expected at the end of the summer.57 Moore was apparently
convinced of the genuineness of Poddar's stated intent because he, along with
two other colleagues, sought to have Poddar committed for observation in a
mental hospital, an effort that was thwarted when members of the campus
police department who were enlisted to detain Poddar physically released him
in exchange for his assurance that he would leave Tatiana alone.58 Two
months later, on October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff. 59
Tatiana's parents filed suit against Dr. Moore and his colleagues, the cam-
pus police, and the University of California at Berkeley. 6° They claimed that
the defendants negligently failed, during the slightly more than two months
between Poddar's stated intent and the actual fatal assault, to warn Tatiana of
the danger posed to her by Poddar.6 1 They also claimed that the defendants
were negligent in failing to confine Poddar successfully when they tried to do
so on August 20, 1969.62 The California Superior Court in which the case was
initially filed granted the defendants' demurrers to both of the plaintiffs' theo-
more expansive description of the factual allegations set forth in the plaintiff's complaint is
provided by the California Court of Appeal in its intermediate appellate decision. Tarasoff
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 880-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
56 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339.
57 Id. at 341.
58 Dr. Moore told the campus police that if they would bring Poddar to the appropriate state
facility, he would arrange to have him committed involuntarily on an emergency basis for at
least seventy-two hours. Subsequently, Dr. Moore's supervisor and the Director of Psychia-
try at Cowell Memorial Hospital, Dr. Harvey Powelson, directed the psychiatric staff at the
hospital, including Dr. Moore, to stop all attempts to commit Poddar involuntarily. Tarasoff,
108 Cal. Rptr. at 880. Poddar never returned to Dr. Moore or to the Cowell Memorial
Hospital for further treatment.
59 Poddar was arrested and criminally prosecuted for causing the death of Tatiana Tarasoff.
He was convicted of second degree murder and the conviction was appealed to both the
California Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court, the latter of which found the
trial court's instruction to the jury regarding diminished capacity to be prejudicial error and
vacated the conviction. People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1974); People v. Poddar, 103
Cal. Rptr. 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
It is from the reports and records of the criminal case against Poddar that a much richer
version of the facts in the Tarasoff case can be found. A fascinating account of these facts
can be found in Buckner & Firestone, supra note 5, at 192-96, and in Schuck & Givelber,
supra note 1, at 99-106.
It is entirely possible that Tatiana's parents learned of the actions, and inactions, of Dr.
Moore and the other employees of the University of California for the first time while
attending Poddar's criminal trial. After the California Supreme Court overturned Poddar's
conviction, the State of California, in exchange for his agreement to leave the United States
and never return, did not retry him. He went back to India and, according to one author, as
of 1976, he was happily married. Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psycho-
therapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976). According to another source,
he married an attorney. Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient:
Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 290 (1982).





ries of liability without leave to amend.6 3 The California Court of Appeal
upheld the Superior Court's ruling.64 The Supreme Court of California sus-
tained the Superior Court's judgment with respect to the plaintiffs failure to
detain theory, but, in the part of the opinion that has made it so famous,
reversed and remanded regarding the failure to warn claim.
65
The holding of the Tarasoff case is succinctly stated in the fourth para-
graph of the majority opinion. The court writes, "[w]hen a therapist deter-
mines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine, that his
patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation
to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger."
66
This was the first time in California, or in any American jurisdiction, that a
court had formally recognized such a duty.
And so the Tarasoff case emerged in the summer of 1976 as a significant
new addition to the common law of torts, issued by a nationally influential
court with the likely ambition to change long-standing tort law doctrine across
the country. By all measures it is an important case, decided by a court that
was well aware of its importance. What was the nature of the analysis that led
to the court's conclusion in the case? What arguments mattered? What did the
court consider when it contemplated creating new tort law?
One might expect a court facing an issue like the one in Tarasoff from a
formalist perspective to devote a very significant portion of its opinion to a
description of the current doctrine surrounding the issue, a consideration of the
most salient cases, and a careful characterization of the newly-announced rule
as residing harmoniously within the existing pattern of precedent.67 While the
majority opinion in Tarasoff does briefly address the then current case law in
California, no real argumentative energy is expended in the debate among the
majority, the concurrence, and the dissent regarding the characterization of
existing case law; nor in a demonstration that the newly-announced rule can or
cannot be seen as a logical extension of already-established doctrine. There is,
in short, little deference shown to a traditional formalist approach to the
problem. 68
63 Id.
64 Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
65 As discussed in supra note 1, the California Supreme Court issued two different opinions
in the Tarasoff case, the second published a little more than eighteen months after the first
and occasioned by the granting of an unusual appellate rehearing in the case. It is the second
opinion, issued on July 1, 1976, that carries the force of precedent and is the prominent
decision in the case. For a description of the differences between the two opinions, see
Buckner & Firestone, supra note 5, at 196-97, and Schuck & Givelber, supra note 1, at 111
n.50, 124 n.112.
66 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340.
67 See SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 142.
6' The majority opinion does make some attempt to reconcile the new duty that it is about to
announce with some existing aspects of the California, and the common, law of torts.
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342-44. Most notably, the opinion tries to position the holding in the
case as consistent with, even if not the necessary logical product of, existing exceptions to
the general rule of no duty to control others based on a special relationship between the
defendant and either the direct harm producer or the victim. Id. at 343-44. Ultimately, at the
conclusion of this discussion, the best that the majority can do is to claim, quoting from a
1974 law review article, that the newly proclaimed Tarasoff duty is not "in any way opposed
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Instead, the court in Tarasoff - majority, concurrence, 69 and dissent70
alike - most eagerly view the problem as one of discerning the likely practical
consequences of either adopting or rejecting the new doctrine, and balancing
the anticipated costs of these likely consequences against the expected benefits.
Should a brand new duty be recognized? "In analyzing this issue, we bear in
mind that legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely con-
clusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be
imposed for damage done," the majority tells us.7 Moreover, "[duty] is not
sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considera-
tions of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled
to protection."7 2
On this point the majority and the dissent agree, with the dissenting opin-
ion stating flatly that, "[p]olicy generally determines duty."'73 And so, thor-
oughly modem and instrumentalist in its approach, the court sets out for itself
the task of identifying and weighing the relative merits of a legal duty imposed
upon psychiatrists to warn others of a serious threat posed by a patient.
B. Arguments For and Against a Therapist Duty to Warn
1. Reduction in Victim Injuries and Deaths
In this analysis, the plaintiffs' side of the case enjoys the more straightfor-
ward presentation. The basic thrust of the argument for the plaintiffs is that
there will be fewer deaths and serious physical injuries if psychiatrists in the
position of defendant Dr. Moore respond to credible threats made by their
patients by reasonably warning the intended victims rather than failing to do so.
to contemporary ground rules on the duty relationship." Id. at 344 (quoting John G. Fleming
& Bruce Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REV.
1025, 1030 (1974)).
The Fleming and Maximov article was published during the period between the issu-
ance of the decision by the California Court of Appeal and the first opinion of the California
Supreme Court. It addresses itself directly to the facts of the case. A number of commenta-
tors have noted the strong influence that the article seems to have had on the second opinion
by the California Supreme Court. Buckner and Firestone observe that "[t]he second opinion
follows the format established by Fleming and Maximov to a much greater extent than does
the first. It is almost as if the court uses their law review article as intellectual justification
for reaching its decision, seemingly made more independently the first time." Buckner &
Firestone, supra note 5, at 197. See also id. at 188-90; Stone, supra note 59, at 361-63.
69 Justice Mosk, concurring and dissenting, betrays no interest at all in Tarasoffs logical
consistency with the larger scheme of duty doctrine in tort law. Instead, his objection is with
that part of the Tarasoff duty that could hold a therapist liable for negligently failing to
anticipate a patient's future violent behavior, given Justice Mosk's view that therapists are
"incredibly inaccurate" at making such predictions - a thoroughly instrumentalist concern.
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 353-54.
70 Justice Clark's dissenting opinion, joined by Justice McComb, is similarly unconcerned
with any traditionally formalist aspects of the case, focusing instead on the proper interpreta-
tion and application of California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and on the likely detrimental
effects of a formal duty to warn on the efficacy of psychological therapy. Id. at 354-58
(Clark, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 342.
72 Id. (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968) (quoting WILLIAM L. PRos-
SER, LAW OF TORTS 332-33 (3d ed. 1964))).
73 Id. at 358 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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Even if harm cannot be averted in every case, there is little question that per-
mitting the victim at least the possibility of flight, fight, or watchfulness would
result in less overall harm to such victims.
74
In addition to the very traditional tort law argument that the existence of
this legal duty will result in less harm and more compensation, the plaintiffs
can argue that such a duty accurately articulates the preferred moral posture on
the issue. Here there is invoked the image of the psychiatrist, having heard a
credible threat by a patient against another, going about the remaining routine
of his day, seeing other patients, returning phone calls, completing paperwork,
driving home, having dinner, all while his patient stalks and kills the intended
victim. Who could morally justify the doctor's failure to engage in merely
reasonable efforts to try to warn the unwitting victim? Even if a complicated
case for refraining to warn could be constructed, it is hard to ignore that com-
plete inaction is a much easier option for the doctor than an effort to help. In
addition, the issuance of a warning aligns the psychiatrist, at least in the
patient's mind, on the side of a stranger and against the patient, who is, after
all, the source of professional revenue for the doctor's practice.7 5
2. Cost of False Warnings
The case against the creation of a therapist duty to warn is far more com-
plicated. It begins with an appreciation of the social cost incurred when a phy-
74 Interestingly, this aspect of the plaintiff's argument is given very little attention or scru-
tiny in any of the published Tarasoff opinions, nor in the subsequent academic literature. It
is as if the basic thrust of the plaintiff's position, that the existence of a legal duty for
therapists to warn will result in meaningfully fewer physical injuries to intended victims, is
simply assumed to be true. The attention of courts and commentators is directed instead
toward identifying and debating the various costs generated by the formal legal duty. Per-
haps this has occurred because the claim seems to be so clearly plausible within the specific
circumstances of the Tarasoff case, where two months passed between Poddar's voicing of
the threat to Dr. Moore and his attack on Tatiana, time that Poddar used, in part, to insinuate
himself with Tatiana's brother, a relationship that aided Poddar in determining when he
could find Tatiana alone. Schuck & Givelber, supra note 1, at 102-04.
As a general matter, the degree to which the existence of a formal Tarasoff duty to warn
can be expected to save the lives of, and prevent serious physical injury to, potential victims
is not at all clear. After all, quite a few different and rather uncommon factors must all fall
into place in a given situation in order for one to be able to say with confidence that the
existence of the Tarasoff duty actually prevented harm. What would be required is not just a
threat, not just a threat followed by an attempt, and not just a threat followed by a successful
attempt, but all of: (1) a patient making a threat to a therapist that is sufficiently clear and
credible to trigger the Tarasoff duty; (2) followed by a decision on the part of the therapist to
try to warn the intended victim, though the therapist would not have done so in the absence
of the formal Tarasoff duty; (3) followed by the actual receipt of the therapist's warning by
the intended victim; (4) followed by a genuine attempt by the patient to harm the intended
victim; and, finally (5) followed by the failure of the attempt to fully succeed when it other-
wise would have succeeded had the therapist not warned the intended victim. Surely such a
confluence of factors is not that common, and in circumstances such as these where the
justification for the Tarasoff duty depends upon a balancing of expected costs and benefits,
the degree to which such circumstances are common or not matters a great deal.
15 See C.J. Meyers, The Legal Perils of Psychotherapeutic Practice (pt. II): Coping with
Hedlund and Jablonski, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 39, 44 (1984); Thomas J. Rudegeair & Paul
S. Appelbaum, On the Duty to Protect an Evolutionary Perspective, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 419, 424 (1992).
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sician issues a formal warning to a third person that a patient under his care has
threatened to inflict upon the recipient of the warning a serious bodily injury or
to cause his death. Once a formal legal duty to issue such a warning is in place,
psychiatrists will be advised to maintain a careful record of all such warnings
issued, so one might expect the great majority of such warnings to be either
immediately or eventually issued in writing.76 The following is the text of an
actual post-Tarasoff warning letter, with names redacted:7 7
Dear
As required by the Tarasoff Decision, we must notify those persons whose lives
have been threatened. This to advise you that __ has made threats against your
life.
We have notified the Police Department and the Mental Health Authorities of
this and we strongly advise you to take precautions in the event that - is dis-
charged from the hospital. One of the avenues available to you is in obtaining a
restraining order from the District Attorney's Office in _
Our plan is to discharge - upon stabilization, which may take up to 17
days. May we strongly advise you to take precautions in the event that he is released,
as we are not able to force a person to leave the city.
For further information and/or assistance, you may contact this office at __
during work hours; after hours you may call to speak to the "ON CALL" Psychiatrist
at __ (to have him paged), the Police Department, and/or the nearest Mental
Health Clinic in your area.
Sincerely,
Chief of Psychiatry
Imagine being the recipient of such a letter. Assume that you are the
spouse, parent, child, close friend, supervisor, or co-worker of the patient who
presumably poses to you a threat so serious that such a letter is thought by the
Chief of Psychiatry to be necessary.7 8 Imagine further that you are the patient
about whom the letter is sent to some combination of spouse, parent, child,
friend, or co-worker. One can hardly doubt that the issuance of such a warning
carries with it enormous social cost within the community of the patient's
friends and relations - cost that will likely last for years, and quite possibly a
lifetime.
If lives are saved, or serious physical injury averted, then all the pain and
social disruption involved can be seen as necessary. But what if the warning
was in fact not necessary? What if the patient would never have actually tried
to act out the threat? In such cases, the enormous social harm caused by each
unnecessary warning would have to be viewed as a cost of the rule that must be
balanced against its expected benefits.79
76 Buckner & Firestone, supra note 5, at 221; Rosenhan et al., supra note 3, at 1220; Yoni
P. Wise, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the
Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 182 n.88 (1978).
7' A copy of this letter, similarly redacted, is in the possession of the author.
78 AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 7-9, 28 (1974).
" Some evidence exists that many Tarasoff warnings will be unnecessary because the
potential victim will already be aware of the threat posed by the patient. Buckner & Fire-
stone, supra note 5, at 218 (citing Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Violence, Civil
Commitment, and Hospitalization, 174 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 107 (1986)). While
warnings issued under such circumstances are unnecessary, they are not false in the sense
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Unsurprisingly, opponents of a formal Tarasoff duty have argued that psy-
chiatrists, and other therapists, are not at all good at predicting the likelihood of
a particular patient acting out on hostile, physically aggressive feelings that he
may have towards another.8 ° Their training and experience all focus on treat-
ment and healing and hardly at all on the making of accurate predictions of
specific future patient behavior.8' Thus, they argue, the imposition upon ther-
apists of a duty to warn of such future behavior will surely result in large num-
bers of false warnings and the corrosive social consequences that will
inevitably follow.
82
that phrase is used herein and do not carry the same kind of social cost to the patient or the
recipient.
80 This is one of the central assertions advanced by critics of a formal Tarasoff duty, espe-
cially by those critics in the psychiatric community. For a sample of this literature, see AM.
PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, supra note 78, at 28; Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The
Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1099 (1976); Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of
Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 447, 451 (1974); Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R.
Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62
CAL. L. REV. 693, 696, 734, 752 (1974).
Some studies, however, have shown therapist identifications of violent patients that
were statistically significant. Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Vio-
lence to Others, 269 JAMA 1007 (1993). Other evidence seems to suggest a meaningfully
higher incidence of violent behavior in persons diagnosed as suffering from certain serious
mental illnesses, though this evidence does not establish that therapists are able to predict
which of those patients so diagnosed will actually exhibit violent behavior. Jeffrey W,
Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence From the
Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 Hosp. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 761, 768-69
(1990).
Two excellent recent reviews of the empirical research that has been done on the ability
of therapists to predict violent behavior by their patients are presented in Kevin S. Douglas
& Jennifer L. Skeem, Violence Risk Assessment: Getting Specific About Being Dynamic, 1 I
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 347, 353 (2005), and John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment:
Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901 (2000).
"1 Stephen D. Hart, The Role of Psychopathy in Assessing Risk for Violence: Conceptual
and Methodological Issues, 3 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 121-37 (1998).
Even now, more than thirty years after the Tarasoff decision, it is not at all clear that
any clinical standards for the prediction of dangerous behavior in patients exist. See Paul S.
Appelbaum, Implications of Tarasoff for Clinical Practice, in THE POTENTIALLY VIOLENT
PATIENT AND THE Tarasoff Decision in Psychiatric Practice 94-106 (James C. Beck ed.,
1985) ("[Tjhere is no professional standard for predicting future violence."); Douglas &
Skeem, supra note 80, at 352 ("Currently, there are no empirically validated instruments
specifically designed to assess risk state."). This led one prominent commentator discussing
the Tarasoff case to say that "[o]ne can only wonder what it means to apply standards to
skills which do not exist." Stone, supra note 59, at 371. See also Mark Kaufman, Post-
Tarasoff Legal Developments and the Mental Health Literature, 55 BULL. MENNINGER CLIN.
308, 311 (1991); Robert M. Wettstein, The Prediction of Violent Behavior and the Duty to
Protect Third Parties, 2 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 291, 311 (1984).
82 Brian Ginsberg, Tarasoff at Thirty: Victim's Knowledge Shrinks the Psychotherapist's
Duty to Warn and Protect, 21 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 14-15 (2004); Stone,
supra note 59, at 363 n.23.
Interestingly enough, during the period between its first and second opinions in
Tarasoff, the Supreme Court of California issued an opinion in an altogether different case
that voiced strong skepticism about the ability of therapists to predict future violence by their
patients accurately. People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 364-66 (Cal. 1975).
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This line of argument is embraced by both Justice Clark in dissent, and by
Justice Mosk, who is both concurring and dissenting in the Tarasoff case. Jus-
tice Clark writes, "[b]oth the legal and psychiatric communities recognize that
the process of determining potential violence in a patient is far from exact,
being fraught with complexity and uncertainty."8 3 Justice Mosk asserts that,
"[p]redictions of dangerous behavior, no matter who makes them, are incredi-
bly inaccurate, and there is a growing consensus that psychiatrists are not
uniquely qualified to predict dangerous behavior and are, in fact, less accurate
in their predictions than other professionals." 84
The majority in the case does not dispute that the recognition of a duty to
warn will likely result in false warnings, nor does it engage with the dissenting
Justices on the issue of psychiatrists' relative ability to predict the future violent
behavior of their patients. Instead, it implicitly accepts the problematic nature
of psychiatrists' predictive abilities and nevertheless maintains that, "profes-
sional inaccuracy in predicting violence cannot negate the therapist's duty to
protect the threatened victim. '"" Implicitly, the majority balances the cost of
false warnings against the benefit of genuine warnings and concludes that,
"[t]he risk that unnecessary warnings may be given is a reasonable price to pay
for the lives of possible victims that may be saved."8 6
3. Burdens on the Therapeutic Process
A second important theme of objection to a formal duty to warn highlights
the many costs to the therapeutic process that might be experienced once such a
duty becomes law. Essentially, this line of argument recognizes that a formal
legal duty places both psychiatrist and patient in a difficult position. Both are
likely to respond to difficulties they face in ways that will be profoundly detri-
mental to the therapeutic process.
Again, the starting point is an appreciation of the profound social cost to
the patient that will be generated by the issuance of a Tarasoff warning. Psy-
chiatrists have no choice but to be concerned about the possibility of legal
action brought by a patient who has suffered such consequences and who feels
that the doctor issued the warning on an insufficient basis. 87 Indeed, the court
in Tarasoff makes it clear that such an action would be viable when it writes:
In the light of recent studies it is no longer heresy to question the reliability of psychiatric
predictions. Psychiatrists themselves would be the first to admit that however desirable an infal-
lible crystal ball might be, it is not among the tools of their profession .... [I]t may legitimately
be inquired whether there is anything in the education, training or experience of psychiatrists
which renders them particularly adept at predicting dangerous behavior."
Id. at 365 (quoting Murel v. Balt. City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355, 364-65 n.2 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari)).
83 Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 360 (Cal. 1976) (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
84 Id. at 354 (quoting Murel, 407 U.S. at 364-65 n.2 (Douglas,.J., dissenting from dismissal
of certiorari)).
85 Id. at 346.
86 Id.
87 See Runyon v. Smith, 749 A.2d 852 (N.J. 2000). The case was also discussed in Gins-
berg, supra note 82, at 27-28. See also the cases cited in Merton, supra note 59, at 303 n.96.
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[T]he therapist's obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a confidence
unless such disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and even then that he do
so discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the privacy of his patient to the
fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the threatened danger.
88
A therapist is thus placed between the rock of possible liability to the
victim if the therapist does not warn and the patient in fact harms, and the hard
place of possible liability to the patient if the therapist warns unnecessarily.8 9
Faced with these twin exposures, therapists would be well-advised to disclose
fully in advance to their patients the possibility that a warning will be issued if,
in the course of treatment, the therapist believes that a credible threat exists.90
In effect, at the very start of the therapeutic relationship, the healer turns to the
afflicted and makes it clear that if their conversation turns in the wrong direc-
tion, the healer will cause profound damage to at least one of the patient's most
intimate relationships.
Whether aware of this possibility in advance, or informed of it at the start
of therapy, one might expect the existence of such a serious risk to operate as a
powerful deterrent for some persons to seek, or to continue, psychiatric treat-
ment.9' In fact, because they face the greatest risk of triggering the warning
and paying the resulting price, it is exactly those persons who are struggling
88 Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347.
89 Buckner & Firestone, supra note 5, at 221.
90 See Fleming & Maximov, supra note 68, at 1056-60; Robert Sadoff, Informed Consent,
Confidentiality and Privilege in Psychiatry: Practical Applications, 2 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 101, 105 (1974); Recent Case, Evidence - Sixth Circuit Holds That
Tarasoff Disclosures Do Not Vitiate Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege - United States v.
Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000), 114 HARV. L. REV. 2194, 2199 (2001).
A survey of therapists conducted in 1987 found that 65.8% of them "almost always" or
"sometimes" discussed the possibility of disclosure to a third party with their patients, and
that 22.1% of them always did so. Rosenhan et al., supra note 3, at 1212-13. These results
led the authors of the study to conclude that, "[i]n accord with law, psychotherapists con-
tinue to warn patients that certain conversation is not confidential and will need to be
revealed to relevant third parties." Id. at 1222.
91 See Ginsberg, supra note 82, at 13 ("[I]t can be logically argued that patients might be
less willing to seek treatment if they know that any desire the therapist perceives as signifi-
cant and violent must be communicated to a potential third party victim."); Rosenhan et al.,
supra note 3, at 1191 ("Without the psychotherapist's assurance of confidentiality, the
patient's conscious and unconscious inhibitions may deter him from expressing his inner-
most thoughts."). This point is also made by one of the dissenting judges in Tarasoff. 551
P.2d at 359 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at
the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 187-88 (1960) and Abraham S. Goldstein &
Jay Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36
CONN. B. J. 175, 178 (1962)).
But see Buckner & Firestone, supra note 5, at 221, where the authors conclude that
"[t]here is just no evidence thus far that patients have been discouraged from coming to
therapy, or discouraged from speaking freely once there, for fear that their confidentiality
will be breached." However, just one paragraph later, the authors note that "the studies thus
far have been based upon information primarily obtained from direct questions posed to
therapists" and they acknowledge the inherent limitations in drawing conclusions from such
data. Id. at 221-22.
In an article frequently cited by the majority in Tarasoff, John Fleming and Bruce Max-
imov suggest that even if the existence of a Tarasoff duty to warn were to deter some
patients with hostile tendencies from seeking therapy, it will also likely operate as an incen-
tive to seek therapy for patients who wish to make such disclosures to the therapist as a "cry
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with issues of hostility, aggression, and violent ideation, and who might pose
the greatest risk of actually inflicting harm on others, who are presented with
the strongest deterrent to seek treatment. For all such persons who respond to
this disincentive by failing to seek help or who discontinue treatment, the possi-
bility of preventing them from harming another as a result of effective thera-
peutic intervention is completely eliminated.9 2
Even for those patients who do seek treatment, a powerful incentive con-
tinues to exist to withhold from the therapist any disclosure of hostile thoughts,
feelings, wishes, or dreams that might possibly trigger the issuance of a warn-
ing.9 3 To the extent that such disclosures are a valuable component of the
therapist's ability to diagnose and act, the effectiveness of the treatment exper-
ienced by the patient will be significantly compromised.94
Moreover, one would expect that a patient's ability to place his trust fully
in the therapist would decrease along with the patient's understanding that the
therapist may be forced to issue a Tarasoff warning and thereby to cause him
great harm. Again, to the extent that a patient having trust in the therapist is
important to the mode of therapy employed, the effectiveness of the patient's
therapeutic experience will most likely be diminished as a result of the exis-
for help," hoping that the therapist will take control and prevent them from doing harm.
Fleming & Maximov, supra note 68, at 1039-40.
92 Ginsberg, supra note 82, at 13.
93 An oft-cited study conducted in the years immediately following the Tarasoff case found
that 24.5% of the therapists surveyed noted a decrease in their patients' willingness to dis-
close violent thoughts once the patients became aware that the therapist might disclose this
information to a third party. Wise, supra note 76, at 177 n.67. A later study, conducted in
1987, found that "sixty percent of responding psychotherapists felt their patients were at
least somewhat more reluctant to divulge sensitive information when aware that their confi-
dences could potentially be disclosed." Rosenhan et al., supra note 3, at 1214.
See also Stone, supra note 59, at 367, 369 ("[A] patient may refrain from expressing
feelings which in fact embody no real intention to harm a third party if he must fear that the
therapist, impelled by a legal duty, will reveal them to others .... The potentially violent
patient is thereby put on notice that he should be alienated from the therapist and conceal any
violent intentions if he believes it to be in his best interest.").
9 Joseph Dubey, Confidentiality as a Requirement of the Therapist: Technical Necessities
for Absolute Privilege in Psychotherapy, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1093 (1974); Ginsberg,
supra note 82, at 12 (citing BENJAMIN J. SADOCK & VIRGINIA A. SADOCK, I KAPLAN &
SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 470 (6th ed. 1995)). See also
Rosenhan et al., supra note 3, at 1216 ("To the extent that candid disclosure is necessary for
successful psychotherapy, patients' awareness of the limits of confidentiality may decrease
the possibility of achieving successful therapeutic results.").
The United States Supreme Court, in considering the status of the psychotherapist-
patient evidentiary privilege, has artfully articulated the role that full and free disclosure
plays in the ultimate success of treatment: "Effective psychotherapy ... depends upon an
atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and
complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears .... [T]he mere possibility of
disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful
treatment." Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996). In this case, the Court also noted the
words of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee at the time that it recommended to
Congress that it recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence: "[T]here is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psy-
chiatric treatment." Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242
(1972) (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 45, CONFIDEN-
TIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 92 (1960)).
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tence of a formal duty to warn.9 5 And again, this undesirable effect will oper-
ate most powerfully in the case of just those patients who could most use
therapeutic intervention to help them avoid doing harm to others.
From the perspective of therapists, the prospect of legal liability attaching
to the decision to warn or not to warn whenever a patient indicates that he may
pose a threat to another makes the treatment of such patients relatively undesir-
able. If given a choice, one would expect therapists to choose to avoid such
patients in favor of others who do not present symptoms of hostility and
aggression.9 6
As relatively undesirable patients, people struggling with violent impulses
may have difficulty finding therapists willing to treat them. Those who do find
treatment are likely to find it among therapists who have little or no choice in
the selection of their patients. Moreover, therapists who do find themselves
treating such patients may be tempted to engage in measures designed to mini-
95 See DONALD J. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 44 (1973) ("[T]he
essence of much psychotherapy is the learning of trust in the external world by the formation
of a trusting relationship with the therapist."); William 0. Faustman & David J. Miller,
Considerations in Prewarning Clients of the Limitations of Confidentiality, 60 PSYCHOL.
REP. 195 (1987); Rosenhan et al., supra note 3, at 1192 ("Establishing a trusting relationship
is considered a fundamental aspect of effective psychotherapy .... [I]f the trust between the
therapist and patient is not developed because of the potential revelation of confidential
communications to outside parties, the likelihood of achieving success in therapy may be
frustrated."). But see id. at 1192 n.174 for a brief discussion of commentators who have
suggested that the existence of the Tarasoff duty can have therapeutic benefits for patients.
The Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has written eloquently on the
importance of trust and emotional intimacy in the relationship between therapist and patient:
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He exposes to the
therapist not only what his words directly express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his
fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is
what will be expected of them, and that they cannot get help except on that condition.
Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (quoting M. GUTTMACHER & H.
WEINOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952)).
96 Two of the three most extensive empirical studies of the effect of the Tarasoff case on the
practice of therapists found that this dynamic indeed existed. For example, a project con-
ducted by a team of researchers in 1987 found that 46% of responding psychotherapists have
in one way or another avoided treating potentially dangerous patients. Rosenhan et al.,
supra note 3, at 1209. They further found that among these therapists, 40.3% indicated that
they avoid such patients at least in part out of fear for possible Tarasoff liability. Id. See
also Wise, supra note 76.
Given that these two studies were based upon direct surveys of therapists, it is remarka-
ble that they have uncovered significant evidence of avoidance of potentially violent
patients. Such a result was not anticipated by Rudegeair and Appelbaum when they wrote,
"Given that therapists are likely to be reluctant to describe any history of 'abandonment'
when asked on a questionnaire, the demonstration of this predicted outcome would require a
more oblique research instrument." Rudegeair & Appelbaum, supra note 75, at 424. Rely-
ing on more informal anecdotal data, Rudegeair and Appelbaum recount that "[w]e know
many therapists who report avoiding 'dangerous' patients, in part because of their concern
over the potential for liability." Id.
See also Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Statutory Approaches to Limiting Psychiatrists'
Liability for Their Patients' Violent Acts, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 821 (1989) ("[I]t is
claimed that ... fear of liability may drive therapists away from treating potentially violent
patients."); Howard Gurevitz, Tarasoff: Protective Privilege Versus Public Peril, 134 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 289 (1977); Meyers, supra note 75, at 44; Stone, supra note 59, at 371-72.
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mize their risk of Tarasoff liability. Such measures might include especially
vigorous advance warnings to the patient of the possibility of the therapist hav-
ing to issue a warning, steering conversation with the patient away from prob-
lematic topics, or subtly signaling to the patient in other ways that the therapist
would find discussion of hostile impulses towards others unwelcome.97
Viewed in this way, the adoption of a formal Tarasoff duty to warn can be
seen as aligning the self-interest of both the patient and the therapist in the
effort to avoid circumstances in which the obligation for the therapist to issue
such a warning might arise. Patients may avoid treatment or avoid making any
revelations during the course of treatment that could possibly trigger the obliga-
tion. Therapists may avoid problematic patients altogether or discourage any
such patients that they treat from discussing thoughts or feelings that could be
interpreted as constituting a threat. Each of these responses to the existence of
a formal duty to warn will make it far less likely that persons wrestling with
violent impulses towards others will be moved from the path of implementing
those impulses by effective psychiatric treatment.
Further, because neither therapists nor patients can know in advance with
much certainty whether their interactions will lead into this dangerous territory,
the chilling effect on the willingness to seek treatment, on the selection of
patients, and on the unfettered range of issues explored during therapy can be
expected to exert its influence, to varying degrees, across the full spectrum of
psychiatric practice. This is especially true with respect to the reduction in trust
invested by patients in therapists once they learn that the therapist could, con-
ceivably, be forced by law to reveal their confidences in a way that is almost
certain to cause them great pain. Thus the existence of a Tarasoff duty can be
argued to impose harm on the efficacy of psychiatric care far beyond the spe-
cific patients that are likely to trigger an actual Tarasoff warning.
4. Involuntary Civil Commitment
The third broad front of argument that can be mounted against the creation
of a formal duty to warn revolves around the possibility of involuntary civil
commitment. Now, as in California at the time of the Tarasoff case, it is possi-
ble for a person to be physically detained against his will without having
engaged in any criminal activity, nor even having raised in anyone a reasonable
suspicion of having committed a crime. 98 This possibility, a rare hole in the
fabric of constitutional doctrine designed to limit the possibility of incarcera-
tion to, and even within, the criminal justice system, is created by the existence
9 In the Stanford Study, conducted just one year after Tarasoff, a significant minority of
responding therapists, approximately 25%, indicated that they were reluctant to discuss with
patients issues that might reveal the patients' propensity for violence. Wise, supra note 76,
at 188.
98 Both at the time of the Tarasoff case and at present, involuntary civil commitment prac-
tice in California is governed by the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 5000-5550 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006). See Meredith Lenell, Note, Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act: A Review After Ten Years, 7 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 733 (1977). For a discus-
sion of the conditions and circumstances that led to the passage of the act, see William M.
Burke, Note, The Need for Reform in the California Civil Commitment Procedure, 19 STAN.
L. REV. 992 (1967).
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of what are commonly known as involuntary civil commitment statutes. 99
These statutes typically authorize the unconsented incarceration of a person
thought to be mentally ill for the purpose of psychiatric evaluation and possible
treatment. 10 0
The existence of involuntary civil commitment is relevant to an analysis of
a formal therapist duty to warn in at least two ways. One is the much greater
attractiveness to therapists of the involuntary commitment option in the pres-
ence of a formal therapist duty to warn.
Imagine a patient who behaves in a way that raises a reasonable suspicion
that the patient may pose a risk to another in a jurisdiction that has adopted a
therapist duty to warn. The therapist understands that from this point on he
faces the twin-horned dilemma of either issuing a Tarasoff letter that may sub-
sequently be determined to have been unnecessary or choosing not to warn and
face the risk of the patient actually inflicting harm on another. With these two
unappealing prospects looming, the therapist may see involuntary commitment
of the patient as an appealing option. He could avoid issuing a potentially
unnecessary warning to the possible victim and, at the same time, insure that
the patient is not actually able to cause harm, at least during the period of
involuntary commitment.
Not only will the patient be physically unable to inflict harm during the
period of involuntary commitment, the patient's physical confinement is likely
to occur, if at all, quickly after the threat is manifested and thus might provide a
critical cooling off period, reducing further the risk of eventual harm. Moreo-
ver, even an unsuccessful attempt to commit the patient may be beneficial to
the therapist inasmuch as it creates a record of a formal determination that the
patient's condition does not satisfy the standards for involuntary civil commit-
ment, and thus may not rise to the legal requirement of issuing a Tarasoff warn-
ing. In addition, therapists operating in a Tarasoff jurisdiction are likely to be
99 Two other circumstances in which citizens can be held against their will for a comparably
long period of time without having been convicted of a crime are: (1) pretrial detention
without bail, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); and (2) civil detention of
juveniles, Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
"oo For example, the current statute in California provides:
When any person, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or
gravely disabled, a peace officer, member of the attending staff, as defined by regulation, of an
evaluation facility designated by the county, designated members of a mobile crisis team pro-
vided by Section 5651.7, or other professional person designated by the county may, upon proba-
ble cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into custody and place him or her in a facility
designated by the county and approved by the State Department of Mental Health as a facility for
72-hour treatment and evaluation.
Such facility shall require an application in writing stating the circumstances under which the
person's condition was called to the attention of the officer, member of the attending staff, or
professional person, and stating that the officer, member of the attending staff, or professional
person has probable cause to believe that the person is, as a result of mental disorder, a danger to
others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled. If the probable cause is based on the state-
ment of a person other than the officer, member of the attending staff, or professional person,
such person shall be liable in a civil action for intentionally giving a statement which he or she
knows to be false.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1998). A compilation of involuntary civil commit-
ment statutes is available at A.B.A. COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, INVOLUNTARY
CIVIL COMMITMENT: A MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 85-128 (1988).
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more sensitive and attentive to their patients' expressions of hostility towards
others, and this, too, may lead to an increase in involuntary civil commitments.
For all of these reasons, therapists operating under a duty to warn regime
may find the option of seeking the involuntary civil commitment of problem-
atic patients significantly more attractive than therapists who do not operate
under such a duty. To the extent that the involuntary commitment of mentally
ill persons represents an undesirable, even if necessary, exception to the usual
constitutional protections against incarceration without criminal fault, the crea-
tion of an incentive for therapists to seek such commitments in larger numbers




The second way in which the existence of involuntary civil commitment
statutes influences judicial determinations regarding a formal therapist duty to
warn is more internal to the deliberations of, and the political constraints inevi-
tably faced by, appellate courts. Given their unusual nature and the history of
severe abuse associated with them in other countries, it is not surprising that
involuntary civil commitment statutes have been the target of controversy and
sustained constitutional challenge for more than thirty years.102 At the time of
the Tarasoff case, and at present, the basic standard for the constitutionality of
such statutes is that they must, at a minimum, require a determination by a
psychiatric professional that the person subject to civil commitment poses a
present danger to himself or to others and that this determination be reviewed
and adjudicated before a neutral magistrate within three days of the start of
confinement. 
03
Any court, including the California Supreme Court in Tarasoff, comes to a
case that raises the prospect of a formal duty to warn with an awareness of the
rich history of constitutional litigation involving involuntary civil commitment
10 See SIDNEY BLOCH & PETER REDDAWAY, RUSSIA'S POLITICAL HOSPITALS: THE ABUSE
OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE SOVIET UNION (1977); Svetlana V. Polubinskaya, Law and Psychia-
try in Russia: Looking Backward and Forward, in THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH
LAW 113, 113-15 (Lynda E. Frost & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2001).
102 For interesting accounts of the long history of legal challenges to involuntary civil com-
mitment, see ROBERT D. MILLER, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL
IN THE POST-REFORM ERA xiii-xvii, 3-20 (1987); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, I MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW 1-36 (2d ed. 1998).
103 RALPH REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS 330-33 (1985). The seminal United States Supreme Court case in the area is Add-
ington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). Two important Supreme Court decisions leading up to
the Addington case were Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (applying the federal
constitutional due process clause to involuntary civil commitment), and O'Connor v. Don-
aldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (finding a constitutional liberty right possessed by
nondangerous persons who suffer from mental illness). See ROBERT F. SCHOPP, COMPE-
TENCE, CONDEMNATION, AND COMMITMENT 28-32 (2001).
Unsurprisingly, some observers believe that the mere existence of these legal standards
is insufficient to protect persons subject to involuntary civil commitment proceedings ade-
quately. Bruce J. Winick, The Civil Commitment Hearing: Applying the Law Therapeuti-
cally, in THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 101, at 291, 293 ("Although
due process theory may require a formal adversarial judicial hearing, a large gulf exists
between law on the books and law in action in this context. The formal due process model is
often undermined by the way many attorneys representing individuals in civil commitment
hearings play their roles.").
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statutes.1°" As a result, the justices must understand that no matter how factu-
ally persuasive they may find the argument that psychiatrists and therapists are
not trained for, not experienced in, and not competent to make predictions of
future violent behavior by their patients, it would be jurisprudentially awkward
publicly to base a. decision not to adopt a formal duty to warn on this rationale
when the prevailing constitutional standard for involuntary civil commitment
statutes implicitly depends for its soundness upon just such predictive compe-
tence by psychiatric professionals. Any published opinion in the duty to warn
area that acknowledged the problematic aspects of therapist predictions of
future harmful behavior by their patients could be expected to be quickly taken
up by opponents of involuntary civil commitment in an effort to reopen that
constitutional controversy.' 0 5
Thus, a very important line of argument against the adoption of a formal
therapist duty to warn - starting with therapists' lack of training, experience,
and competence in the prediction of dangerous behavior, moving on to the high
level of false warnings that are likely to be produced as a result, and then recog-
nition of the enormous personal and social cost generated by these false warn-
ings - is burdened by the consequence that embracing these arguments is likely
to have on a largely unrelated area of jurisprudence. Moreover, this burden is
wholly unrelated to the factual accuracy of the argument or to the courts' per-
ception of the actual number of damaging false warnings likely to be issued as
a result of the adoption of a duty to warn rule.
5. Definitional Difficulties
One last area of concern regarding the adoption of a formal therapist duty
to warn is also somewhat internal to the operation of the rule within the com-
mon law court system. Appreciation of these concerns begins with recognition
that, in many ways, the specifics of the Tarasoff case present to the courts a
nearly ideal set of facts upon which to ground the creation of a therapist duty to
1 4 Excellent summaries of the legal treatment of involuntary civil commitment in this coun-
try are provided by PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW
AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 17-33 (1994); JOHN Q. LA FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK
TO aH ASYLUM 82-116 (1992); Perlin, supra note 102, at 52-61.
105 Concerns about the ability of therapists to predict accurately the future violent behavior
of those suffering from mental illness have always resided near the core of legal challenges
to involuntary civil commitment statutes. ScHoPP, supra note 103, at 213-15; John J.
Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Violence Risk Assessment: A Quarter Century of Research,
in THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 101, at 195-200.
After a period of relative dormancy, the movement to circumscribe involuntary civil
commitment legally has been revived in response to the passage of modern sexual predator
statutes. SCHOPP, supra note 103, at 135-87; CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE 254
(2006) ("Since the resurgence of sexual predator statutes in the 1990s, literally hundreds of
judicial decisions have grappled with the definition of mental abnormality in connection with
commitment of sex offenders who have completed their prison terms."). The United States
Supreme Court addressed federal constitutional due process, double jeopardy, and ex post
facto aspects of a one such sexual predator statute in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997).
The newest wave of legal challenge to involuntary civil commitment statutes and prac-
tices is based upon provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See, e.g.,
PERLIN, supra note 102, at 127-33.
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warn. In the Tarasoff case a patient currently under the care of a fully licensed
psychiatrist discloses to the doctor a concrete plan to kill a specifically named
individual in the near future, and in fact actually causes that person's death
within the announced time frame. The court then finds that under these circum-
stances the doctor had an obligation to inform the individual of the impending
danger, and consequently a formal legal duty to warn is born.
However, one can hardly expect most of the cases that will come before
the courts requiring adjudication under the Tarasoff duty to be as simple and as
clean as the Tarasoff case itself. Hence, the adoption of this new duty will
inevitably require the courts to confront variations of facts that will push the
new duty, and its more precise definition, along a number of dimensions.
For example, what kind of harm must be threatened by the patient in order
to trigger the therapist's formal duty to warn? Tarasoff involves a threat of
death, but what about a threat of bodily harm that does not pose a risk of per-
manent physical injury or death? What about a threat of a moderate physical
beating, or a single punch, or a slap across the face, or a shove or a trip? What
about a threat to the intended victim's emotional well-being? Or to her prop-
erty? Or her reputation?
Prosenjit Poddar indicated to Dr. Moore his intention to kill Tatiana
Tarasoff. What if another patient indicated to his therapist his intention to kill a
specific, but unnamed, individual? Or if the patient never specifically named
the intended victim but the therapist deduced or could have reasonably deduced
the identity? What if the therapist might have identified the victim with some
modest investigative efforts, including non-therapeutic interrogation of the
patient? If the patient threatens serious physical injury to "my family," or to
"my enemies at work," or to "those lawyers," does the therapist have a legal
duty to warn a threatened group of people, and of up to what size?
The threat in Tarasoff was communicated to, and thus the duty descended
upon, a fully licensed medical doctor of psychiatry. What if the caregiver
learning of the threat was a licensed therapist who was not a medical doctor, or
a working therapist who did not require a license to practice in the jurisdiction,
or a psychiatric nurse? Does, or should, the formal duty apply to a university
or school counselor, a professor or a teacher, a licensed physician not providing
psychiatric care to the patient, an attorney, a family member, or a best friend?
Though none of these many difficult questions need to be answered, or
even confronted directly, in order to impose a formal duty to warn in the
Tarasoff case, the court's adoption of a general duty in that case inevitably
commits the jurisdiction to a future encounter with these many unresolved
aspects of the doctrine. In addition, until these open issues are dealt with by
courts, or by the legislature of the state, those who may be affected by the duty
must operate under uncertainty and speculation as to the ultimate contours of
the rule.
C. Tarasoff as Instrumentalist Jurisprudence
Given the preceding arguments both in favor and against the adoption in
law of a formal therapist duty to warn, one can see the rather dramatic differ-
ence that the choice of a formalist or an instrumentalist approach to the prob-
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lem would make. A formalist court would focus primarily upon the degree to
which a newly recognized duty to warn could be found to have antecedents in
the tort jurisprudence of the jurisdiction, whether it could be determined to be
consistent, at least analogously, to broader tort principles and maxims, and how
it might reside harmoniously among the existing precedents in the area. An
instrumentalist court, on the other hand, would focus primarily on identifying
and balancing the likely practical benefits of the new duty against its costs, as
did the California Supreme Court.
The realist revolution, over the years, produced a fully-developed analysis
of the many problems inherent in a formalist regime. As the newly ascendant
and currently dominant paradigm, the instrumentalist approach has not yet been
subjected to nearly as pervasive and widely accepted a critique. The Tarasoff
case can serve as a useful and appropriate vehicle for a modest start at identify-
ing some of the more obviously problematic aspects of the instrumentalist
approach.
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF CONDUCTING INSTRUMENTALIST
ANALYSIS WITHIN A FORMALIST PROCEDURAL STRUCTURE
Perhaps the most pervasive problem with the approach adopted by the
Tarasoff court to the question of whether there should exist a formal duty to
warn imposed upon therapists is that it engages in a primarily instrumentalist
endeavor within the confines of a court structure and appellate procedures
designed and built for a formalist world. In other words, the court in Tarasoff
and appellate courts generally operating within the instrumentalist paradigm are
committed to engage in analysis about the likely practical consequences of
competing versions of legal doctrine without the benefit of any regular struc-
tured means by which to identify and scrutinize such consequences seriously.
Appellate courts engaged in instrumentalist analysis are required to ground
their decisions in an analysis of the likely consequences of these decisions on
regulated communities about which the members of the court may have little or
no actual knowledge or experience and about which appellate procedures pro-
vide them with almost no means to learn reliably."0 6
For example, in the Tarasoff case it is absolutely clear that one critical
element in an instrumentalist analysis of the issue is the determination of the
extent to which the creation of a formal duty to warn will cause therapists to
issue more false warnings than they would otherwise. Even more critically, the
court must estimate the number of false warnings that will be issued by ther-
apists in response to the duty compared to the number of valuable warnings that
the existence of the duty will provoke. In other words, how will the ratio of
false warnings to necessary warnings be altered when the jurisdiction moves
from there being no duty to warn to the embrace of a Tarasoff duty?
Under current appellate procedures, this is seriously problematic. How are
appellate court judges supposed to come to such a judgment? How are they
expected even to begin a useful journey to such a determination?
106 For an excellent and interesting explication of this point, see PHILIP SHUCHMAN,
PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 24-60 (1979).
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The judges may have no direct experience whatsoever with psychiatrists
or therapists, or their patients, or the therapeutic process. Worse still, they per-
sonally may have had some direct personal experience with therapists and psy-
chiatric therapy and, as a result, be tempted to over-extrapolate from this very
specific personal experience to therapists and patients and therapy in general.
Moreover, this utterly uncertain and wholly random possession of specialized
knowledge and experience regarding the activity affected by the legal doctrine
at issue characterizes as much the attorneys who develop and deliver the argu-
ments to the court as it does the judges who evaluate those arguments and
ultimately decide.
Not only is there no assurance that the professionals developing instru-
mentalist arguments, or those analyzing them, possess any particular substan-
tive experience or expertise on the activity being regulated, existing appellate
procedures provide the court with practically no opportunity to bring such
expertise into the process. Appellate courts generally work with the record of
the proceedings in the lower courts, the written briefs of the parties, and per-
haps amici curiae, and the oral arguments of counsel. The parties may make
assertions regarding the likely consequences of one interpretation of a legal
doctrine or another, and these assertions may be footnoted in the briefs, but
they are not permitted to bring persons with relevant expertise or experience
into the appellate proceedings to testify and be cross-examined for the benefit
of the appellate court. Similarly, appellate courts do not routinely seek inde-
pendent experts to educate and advise them as to the likely practical conse-
quences of their decisions.
While the kind of expert testimony, independent expert input, and factual
investigation that are little part of the appellate process are indeed a regular part
of trial court procedure, procedures at the trial level of litigation are designed
primarily to provide a fair forum for the resolution of specific disputes between
parties. As such, they are poorly suited to create a record that provides appel-
late courts with a factual picture that is accurate or representative of the regu-
lated community as a whole. By its nature, the fact finding process at the trial
level is focused on the specific history of the parties and their disputes and has
no concern with, and makes no investment in, determining the degree to which
the specific facts of the instant case fairly represent the regulated community as
a whole.
Even if the actual real life facts of a specific case would be considered to
be reasonably representative of the larger community affected by the legal doc-
trine at issue, there are many aspects of trial procedure that make it unlikely
that the abstracted legal facts developed to determine the eventual outcome of
the case at the trial level will provide the appellate courts with a good and
sufficient factual basis for instrumental analysis. In other words, there are
many reasons to believe that the factual representation of any specific case that
comes before an appellate court enjoys only a modest correspondence to the
actual factual incidents that transpired among the parties. Thus there is less
reason to believe that the factual version of the case presented to the appellate




The dynamics by which the actual facts of a dispute may differ signifi-
cantly from the presentation of those facts to an appellate court begin with the
inevitable sophistication of parties who become regular, recurring, albeit reluc-
tant, participants in litigation. Such parties learn fairly quickly to develop their
methods of recording facts and to design their systems for maintaining,
organizing, and purging factual records in a manner that provides them with
maximum strategic advantage in possible future litigation. Thus, in such cases,
the framework within which the basic facts of a transaction are gathered, main-
tained, and made available for legal discovery is oriented far less toward histor-
ical or empirical accuracy than it is towards the tactical advantage of the party
in possession of the factual records.
Once litigation commences, the process of factual investigation is under-
taken exclusively by the interested parties themselves. In the pursuit of factual
discovery the parties are, of course, motivated far more by a desire to uncover
or conceal information that is strategically relevant to the litigation rather than
any ambition to develop a full and accurate factual picture of events. Thus, the
process of factual investigation is heavily influenced by, indeed it operates
entirely within, the specific contours created by the relevancy of information as
determined by the legal doctrines likely to be applied to the case and by the
admissibility of that information as determined by the rules of evidence. More-
over, the accuracy and thoroughness of the factual picture developed by the
discovery process is also compromised by the financial limitations faced by the
parties, limitations that place pressure on the attorneys to focus their investiga-
tive efforts narrowly on only the most strategically valuable information.
Even beyond the distorting effect of possible future litigation on the main-
tenance of factual data and the vast difference between an objective empirical
investigation and the legal discovery process, there are a plethora of legal doc-
trines that routinely come into play during litigation that cause the official ver-
sion of facts in a trial to vary significantly from the actual historic events.' 7
Included among these devices are factual stipulations entered into by the parties
and admissions, both of which are routinely encouraged by trial court judges,
and neither of which are required to be empirically accurate in order to become
an undisputed part of the factual record of the case."0 8 In a similar way, other
107 During the 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, delivered before the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York in 1974, Marvin E. Frankel, United States District Judge,
famously stated that "our adversary system rates truth too low among the values that institu-
tions of justice are meant to serve." Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1975).
"I See Rural Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. H.C. Jones Constr. Co., 149 S.E.2d 625, 631
(N.C. 1966) ("[Parties] may, by stipulation or judicial admission, establish any material fact
which has been in controversy between them, and thereby eliminate the necessity of submit-
ting an issue to the jury with reference to it. Once a stipulation is made, a party is bound by
it and he may not thereafter take an inconsistent position."); Andrews v. Olaff, 122 A. 108,
111 (Conn. 1923) ("A stipulatory agreement thus arrived at ought not to be disturbed or
relief afforded contravening it, unless one party deceived the other by false and fraudulent
statements known to be untrue, or recklessly made without regard to the fact, or definite
information."); MARLA K. CLARK, 26 INDIANA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA § 10 (2005) ("[O]nce
the parties enter into a stipulation and the court approves it, the stipulation is binding on all




doctrinal devices such as formal presumptions and burdens of proof, while crit-
ical aids to fairness and efficiency, alter the operation of the fact finding pro-
cess in litigation so that it potentially operates quite differently than would an
objective empirical investigation.1 °9
Witness testimony is still another area of concern. To the extent that the
primary mode of presentation at trial is the live testimony of witnesses, the
dependability of the factual result will suffer from the notoriously problematic
accuracy of the testimony of witnesses, many of whom are unaware of the
importance of the events in question at the time they observed them, who may
have made the observations years before they testify about them at trial, and
who by the date of their court appearance are typically hyper-aware of the
consequences of what they might say."'
In addition to the above, the facts of a situation brought forward at trial
may not include many of the salient features of the actual situation due to the
existence of standard rules of evidence that exclude relevant, material informa-
tion from the finder of fact. Sometimes otherwise valuable evidence is
excluded because of a concern that, while probative, it is also unacceptably
prejudicial to a party."' At other times, accurate information is kept out of the
trial process because it falls within one of a number of recognized privileges,
including marital," 12 doctor-patient 13 and attorney-client." 4 In all three cases,
the law recognizes that other important societal interests may, under certain
circumstances, override the truth-seeking function of a trial.' 5 While long-
standing, well recognized and generally uncontroversial, these evidentiary rules
Of course, courts should not accept stipulations agreed to by the parties that are demon-
strably false. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 497 (1951); Dillon, Read &
Co. v. United States, 875 F.2d 293, 300 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
'o9 See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 4:8 (7th ed.
1992). See generally id. at §§ 3:1-3:45, 4:1-4:16 ("Likewise courts and legislatures some-
times create presumptions to implement social policy by assisting one class of litigants
against another.").
The United States Supreme Court has disfavored the use of mandatory presumptions in
criminal cases, saying that such presumptions "invade the fact-finding function of the jury."
Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 268 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Sandstrom
v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979)).
"'0 See ELIZABETH F. LoFrus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL 9-93 (Lexis Law Publishing 1997); Gary L. Wells, Scientific Status, in SCIENCE IN
THE LAW: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE ISSUES 391, 402-13 (David L. Faigman et al.
eds., 2002).
I "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
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nevertheless have the consequence of causing the formal legal record of facts in
a given case to deviate, possibly quite significantly, from the actual factual
experience of the parties. 
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Finally, even after the conclusion of all trial activity and the issuance of a
final judgment, it may not be at all clear to an appellate court what precise
version of disputed facts was adopted by the finder of fact in the case. For
example, in a case that is tried before a jury that returns a general verdict, the
appellate court receives the trial record containing evidence presented by the
parties, some of it potentially conflicting and contradictory, and also sees the
jury's general verdict. From these materials, there is often no way for the
appellate court to know what version of disputed facts was relied upon by the
jury in reaching its verdict. In fact, the appellate court has no real guarantee
that the jury as a group actually agreed on a specific, coherent characterization
of the facts of the case.
For all of the above-described reasons, appellate courts can not confi-
dently assume that the facts presented to them in any given case accurately
reflect the actual factual history of the parties. Moreover, the appellate courts
have no serious factual basis for believing that the presented facts of any given
case represent the typical behavior of similarly-situated parties, or in any way
present a reasonably accurate picture of the regulated community at large. In
the absence of such assurances, the development of important legal doctrine on
a case by case basis by appellate courts employing an instrumentalist approach
seems, at best, to be problematic.
V. CONCLUSION
A fundamental change has taken place in the way in which the legal com-
munity views the nature of common law jurisprudence in this country. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, it was widely accepted that appellate courts
determined the outcome of disputed issues of law predominately by the appli-
cation of pre-existing precedent and time-honored legal maxims. When a par-
ticular case presented a novel problem, the court would strive to place the new
issue appropriately securely within the existing pattern of precedent and to rea-
son by analogy from existing principles. The common law would develop and
evolve incrementally as solutions to these new problems that were thought to
tory process is caused by recognition of the privileges, it is not too great a price to pay for
secrecy in certain communicative relations.").
116 State v. 62.96247 Acres of Land in New Castle Hundred, 193 A.2d 799 (Del. Super. Ct.
1963) ("There are many exclusionary rules of evidence that are intended to withhold evi-
dence which is regarded as unreliable or regarded as prejudicial or misleading, but rules of
privileged communications have no such purpose. Such rules of privilege preclude the con-
sideration of competent evidence which could aid in determining the outcome of a case.");
KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (6th ed. 2006) ("[T]he rules of privi-
lege ... are not designed or intended to facilitate the fact-finding process or to safeguard its
integrity. Their effect instead is clearly inhibitive; rather than facilitating the illumination of
truth, they shut out the light."); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVI-
DENCE 285 (3rd ed. 2003) ("[Privileges] are not designed to enhance the reliability of the fact
finding process. On the contrary, they impede the search for truth by excluding evidence
that may be highly probative.").
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be harmonious with existing doctrines came to be recognized and accepted.
The primary work of the common law courts was thought to be this distinctive
identification, maintenance, inductive development, and case-specific deduc-
tive application of the body of precedent in its jurisdiction. This is sometimes
known as formalism.
Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, few members of the
legal community believe that the operation of common law courts is fundamen-
tally formalist in nature. Starting with the influence of the legal realists in the
1920s, a profound shift has taken place in the dominant conception of the
nature of common law jurisprudence. Currently, it is widely understood that
common law courts should, and do, approach the resolution of disputed issues
of law by comparing the anticipated costs and benefits of competing versions of
doctrine and adopting the rule that offers the greatest promise of influencing the
behavior of members of the regulated community in a way that will most effec-
tively address perceived social needs.
This is common law seen less as the logical working out of basic first
principles into an ever fuller, more detailed and complete canon, than it is a
view of the common law as a practical social tool by which certain desirable
goals are pursued. Common law from this perspective does not stand apart as
some kind of distinctive body of logically-derived high principle, but instead
joins other governmental and social mechanisms in an ongoing effort to solve
current social problems and achieve communal goals. This currently dominant
paradigm of common law adjudication can be called instrumentalism.
One of the most distinctive characteristics of our current system of com-
mon law is that, while widely understood to be instrumentalist in its analysis, it
operates within a structure and follows basic procedures that are profoundly
formalist in nature. Thus, while appellate courts, like the California Supreme
Court in the Tarasoff case, consider the creation of significant new common
law doctrine by identifying and weighing its likely consequences in the regu-
lated community and beyond, the appellate courts do not have available to them
the procedural tools to investigate adequately the factual nature of the regulated
community at issue or the anticipated consequences in that community of one
version of legal doctrine or another.
Moreover, the nature of factual investigation in civil litigation is such that
an appellate court cannot with confidence view the record below as being an
accurate and complete depiction of what actually transpired between the parties
in the instant case. It has essentially no empirical basis for believing that the
facts of the instant case are fairly or usefully representative of the larger regu-
lated community. In the absence of reasonable means by which to investigate
seriously the salient factual features of the regulated community and to deter-
mine the likely effects of one legal rule or another on the behavior of partici-
pants in that community, appellate courts engaged in instrumentalist analysis
are grounding their conclusions, and thus basing the common law itself, on
essentially intuitive and seemingly commonsensical beliefs and notions regard-
ing the regulated community and the dynamics of its operation, notions that
may or may not correspond to the actual reality of the situation.
The above analysis attempts to illustrate the shift that has occurred in com-
mon law jurisprudence from formalism to instrumentalism, using the well-
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known case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California as an exam-
ple. In addition, I have tried to describe the many difficulties that courts face,
especially appellate courts, when they engage in instrumentalist legal analysis
within the procedural confines of our still predominately formalist system of
common law adjudication.
I am in no way arguing for a return to a more formalist past. The funda-
mental paradigm shift has occurred and our current understanding of common
law jurisprudence is now dominantly instrumentalist in nature. Less vigorously
noted and analyzed, however, are the many interesting consequences that flow
from the operation of instrumentalist jurisprudence within a largely formalist
procedural structure. It is my hope that the preceding analysis helps in moving
such a discussion forward, and in some small way may stimulate further work
in this area.
